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JURISDICTION AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW:
SOME ISSUES OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN
NEW MEXICO
SETH D. MONTGOMERY* & ANDREW S. MONTGOMERY"
[Clourtswhich are createdby written law, andwhose jurisdictionis defined by
written law, cannot transcendthatjurisdiction.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Constitution defines the appellate jurisdiction2 of the state's two
principal appellate courts, the supreme court and the court of appeals, largely in
terms of what may be provided by law.3 The supreme court is to exercise appellate
jurisdiction in all cases "as may be provided by law," except that a sentence of death
or life imprisonment is always to be appealed directly to the supreme court, and in
every case an aggrieved party has an absolute right to one appeal.4 The court of
appeals is also to exercise appellate jurisdiction "as may be provided by law,"
including direct review of decisions of administrative agencies as authorized "by
law," and it may issue writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction as authorized "by rules
of the supreme court. ' 5
The phrase "provided by law" ordinarily means provided by the legislature. That
is the conclusion that New Mexico courts generally have reached when they have
considered the issue. 6 It is a conclusion in harmony with New Mexico's legal and
constitutional history and with the courts' proper role in a government of separate
powers.7
This Article's principal thesis, however, is that the supreme court has departed
in some instances from the constitutional provisions governing the two courts'
appellate jurisdiction.8 Although the courts have statutory authority to reassign
appeals in well-defined circumstances, 9 they do not have discretion to redefine their
1937-1998. Justice, New Mexico Supreme Court, 1989-1994.
Member, State Bar of New Mexico. My father, Seth Montgomery, began work on this Article a few
months before his death in 1998. He asked me to assist him in completing it. The inspiration for the Article is his.
The delay in getting it into print is mine. Kind thanks to Thomas W. Olson, Edward Ricco, Sarah M. Singleton, and
others unnamed for their helpful comments and to Yolanda Sandoval and Robert P. Schelly for their valuable
research assistance.
1. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,93 (1807).
2. By "jurisdiction" we mean a court's power to hear and decide a dispute. See Ballew v. Denson, 63 N.M.
370, 373, 320 P.2d 382, 383 (1958). By "appellate jurisdiction" we mean the power to review and affirm, modify,
or set aside a lower tribunal's decision. BLACK's LAW DICnONARY 868 (8th ed. 2004).
3. The New Mexico Constitution also confers appellate jurisdiction on the state's district courts in some
cases. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 13. The appellate jurisdiction of the district courts is beyond the scope of this Article.
4. Id. art. VL § 2.
5. Id. art. Vl,§ 29.
6. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 117 N.M. 745, 747 n.2, 877 P.2d 551, 553 n.2 (1994) (."[P]rovided by law'
generally means 'provided by statutes."' (citing State v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 772, 487 P.2d 197, 200 (Ct. App.
1971))); VanderVossen v. City of Espaflola, 2001-NMCA-016, 1 10, 24 P.3d 319, 323 ("[A]rticle VL section
29.. .expressly addresses the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and delegates to the legislature the power
to define that jurisdiction."); see also State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm'n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
28, 73 P.3d 197, 204 (construing the phrase "provided by law" to mean that "that law must come from the
Constitution or legislation"); cf.City of Las Cruces v. Pub. Employee Labor Relations Bd., 1996-NMSC-024, 1 5,
917 P.2d 451, 453 (construing the phrase "as otherwise provided by law" to encompass regulations "promulgated
to further the legislative intent" behind statute).
7. See infra Parts Ill,
V.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra notes 31-34, 205-223 and accompanying text.
*

**
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jurisdiction contrary to or in absence of a statute. Thus, for example, when the
supreme court directs by rule that appeals "shall be taken to the Supreme Court" in
matters "in which jurisdiction has been specifically reserved to the Supreme Court
by... Supreme Court order or rule," and that "[a]ll other appeals shall be taken to the
Court of Appeals,"'" it acts unconstitutionally."
To develop this thesis, the Article reviews the scope of appellate jurisdiction in
New Mexico from historical and analytical standpoints. The purpose of this Article
is to provide a descriptive analysis of where the law presently stands, how it arrived
at that point, and whether any further legislative or judicial changes are advisable.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN NEW MEXICO
A. The New Mexico Constitution
The New Mexico Constitution explicitly mandates in article In, section 1 that the
powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are to be separate.' 2 The
mandate itself, however, does not say what those powers are. Instead, it simply
prohibits one government branch from exercising powers "properly belonging" to
another.' 3 The identification of those powers lies elsewhere.
The powers of New Mexico's judicial department are set out in article VI of the
constitution. Since statehood, the judicial power has resided in a supreme court,
district courts, other lower courts, and in the senate when sitting as a court of
impeachment. 4 Since 1965, judicial power has also resided in an intermediate court
of appeals.'"
Article VI gives the supreme court original jurisdiction in enumerated matters and
superintending control over the state'sjudiciary. 16 These original and superintending
powers have remained unchanged since statehood and are not qualified by what may
be provided by law. Separate from these powers, the supreme court also has
appellate jurisdiction, which has changed considerably. Article VI was amended in
1965 and now defines the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court as follows:
Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or
life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court. In all other cases,
criminal and civil, the supreme court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as may
beprovidedby law; provided that an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right
to one appeal.' 7
The court of appeals' jurisdiction, as established in 1965, is as follows:
The court of appeals shall have no original jurisdiction. It may be authorized by
law to review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the state, and it

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Rule 12-102 NMRA.
See infra Part W.A.
N.M. CONST. art. 111,§ 1.
Id.
Id. art. VI,§ 1.
Id. art. VI, §§ 1, 28.

16. Id. art. VI, § 3.
17. Id. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
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may be authorized by rules of the supreme court to issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law.'8

The language of sections 2 and 29 indicates that the appellate jurisdiction of the
two courts is to be defined by the legislature in all appeals except those from district
court judgments imposing sentences of death or life imprisonment. This conclusion
follows from two considerations. The first is the meaning of the phrase "provided
by law," which, as we have noted, is generally understood to mean provided by the
legislature.' 9 The second is the New Mexico Constitution's distinction between that
which may be provided by law and that which may be provided by rules. Whereas
the court of appeals may exercise appellate jurisdiction "as may be provided by
law," it may issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction as authorized "by rules of the
supreme court."2 ° These different terms presumably have different meanings.2
B. The Basic Statutes

The New Mexico legislature promptly fulfilled its constitutional charge to
"provide by law" for the courts' jurisdiction. In 1966, it enacted two statutes, now
compiled as sections 34-5-8 and 34-5-14, that prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of
the court of appeals and the supreme court, respectively. Section 34-5-8 provides in
part:
The appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals is coextensive with the state,

and the court has jurisdiction to review on appeal:
(1) any civil action not specifically reserved to the jurisdiction of the supreme
court by the constitution or by law; [and]
(7) decisions in any other action as may be provided by law.22
Section 34-5-14 authorizes the supreme court to conduct discretionary review by
writ of certiorari in cases that the court of appeals decides, as well as discretionary
18. Id. art. VI, § 29 (emphasis added).
19. See supra note 6.
20. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
21. See, e.g., In re Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 37 N.M. 194, 199, 20 P.2d 918, 921 (1933) ("The
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A) (1983). The full text of section 34-5-8(A) reads:
The appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals is coextensive with the state, and the court has
jurisdiction to review on appeal:
(1) any civil action not specifically reserved to the jurisdiction of the supreme court by the
constitution or by law;
(2) all actions under the [Workers'] Compensation Act, the New Mexico Occupational
Disease Disablement Law, the Subsequent Injury Act and the federal Employers' Liability
Act[s];
(3) criminal actions, except those in which a judgment of the district court imposes a
sentence of death or life imprisonment;
(4) postconviction remedy proceedings, except where the sentence involved is death or life
imprisonment;
(5) actions for violation of municipal or county ordinances where a fine or imprisonment is
imposed;
(6) decisions of administrative agencies of the state; and
(7) decisions in any other action as may be provided by law.
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review by certification in cases that the court of appeals does not decide but certifies
to the supreme court for decision.23 The statute also authorizes the supreme court to
hear nondiscretionary, direct appeals in some cases: "The appellate jurisdiction of
the supreme court is coextensive with the state and extends to all cases where
appellate jurisdiction is not specifically vested by law in the court of appeals."24
Together, these two statutes present something akin to the classic conflict-of-law
problem of renvoi:25 a statute that refers to another statute, which in turn refers back
to the first-two mirrors facing each other. If neither of these two statutes, nor any
other, provides direction to the proper court, then appellate jurisdiction would
appear paradoxically to lie in both courts and in neither. In both because the appeal
is not specifically reserved by the constitution or by law to the jurisdiction of the
other court. In neither because each statute, itself reserving jurisdiction in one court,
eliminates it in the other. In practice, the renvoi riddle poses only a theoretical
problem as long as some other statute assigns jurisdiction. Whether or not an explicit
answer can be found, however, the jurisdictional question, as framed by both the
constitution and the governing statutes, must be resolved by reference to what the
legislature has provided.26
In addition to the statutes just discussed, several other statutes are relevant to the
analysis of the courts' appellate jurisdiction as provided by law. Since long before
the creation of the court of appeals, three statutes have governed the right of appeal
from final judgments and decisions of the district courts. Those statutes, sections 393-2, 39-3-3, and 39-3-7, deal with appeals from final judgments or decisions in civil,
criminal, and special statutory proceedings, respectively.27 Before 1966, each statute
provided that an eligible party could appeal to the supreme court, which was, of
course, the only court that could review decisions of the district courts.28 In 1966,
the legislature amended each statute to provide for appeal to the supreme court or
the court of appeals, "as appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law in these
courts."'29 The 1966 amendments thus incorporated the legislature's allocation of
appellate jurisdiction between the two courts and conformed to the mandate in

23. Id. § 34-5-14(B), (C) (1972).
24. ld § 34-5-14(A).
25. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1324 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "renvoi ' as "[t]he problem arising when
one state's rule on conflict of laws refers a case to the law of another state, and that second state's conflict-of-law
rule
refers the case either back to the law of the first state or to a third state").
26. This conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the bill that added current subsection 34-5-8(A)(1). See
FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, H.R. 36-430, 1st Sess. add. (N.M. 1983) (HB 430, SB 277, and SB 326 (identical
language)) (on file with the New Mexico Court of Appeals). The analysis notes that
under sections 34-5-14 and 34-5-8, the supreme court and the court of appeals would each have
appellate jurisdiction over all civil cases not specifically reserved to the other. To determine
which civil cases are reserved to which court, it would be necessary to review any law which
might specify the reviewing court.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. NMSA 1978, §§ 39-3-2 (1966) (authorizing appeals in civil actions), 39-3-3 (1972) (authorizing appeals
in criminal actions), 39-3-7 (1966) (authorizing appeals in special statutory proceedings).
28. NMSA 1953, §§ 21-10-2 (1917), 21-10-2.1 (1955), 21-10-5 (1937). The statutes addressing civil and
special statutory proceedings entitled "any party aggrieved" to appeal. Id. §§ 21-10-2, 21-10-5. The criminal appeal
statute as originally enacted in 1955 dealt only with appeals by defendants, Act of Feb. 22, 1955, ch. 30, § 1, 1955
N.M. Laws 49, 49, but the 1966 amendment added a subsection governing appeals by the state, Act of Mar. 1, 1966,
ch. 28, § 36, 1966 N.M. Laws 102, 121-22.
29. Act of Mar. 1, 1966, ch. 28, §§ 35, 36, 39, 1966 N.M. Laws 102, 121-23.
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article VI that the vesting of 3appellate
jurisdiction in the supreme court or the court
0
of appeals is to be "by law.,
Three more statutes authorize the transfer of cases between courts in certain
situations. Section 34-5-8(B) authorizes the supreme court to "provide for the
transfer" from the court of appeals to the supreme court "of any action or decision"
within the court of appeals' jurisdiction under section 34-5-8.3' As this Article shall
elaborate in its examination of appeals in contract cases, this authority enables the
supreme court to hear appeals that otherwise would be taken to the court of appeals
so as to relieve congestion in the intermediate court's docket. 32 Section 34-5-14(C)
authorizes transfer from the court of appeals to the supreme court upon the intermediate court's certification that the appeal involves a question of constitutional
significance or substantial public interest more appropriately decided by the state's
highest court. 33 Finally, section 34-5-10 directs that an appeal filed in the wrong
appellate court be transferred to the proper court so that no injustice results from a
simple error in the place of filing.'
C. The Supreme CourtRules
Given that the New Mexico Constitution generally confers appellate jurisdiction
as may be provided by law, and that the legislature has in fact provided for such
jurisdiction by statute, one might reasonably infer that nothing more need be done
by rule to identify which court has jurisdiction over an appeal. The constitution
mentions supreme court rules, but only in regard to writs that the court of appeals
may issue in aid of its jurisdiction.35 And while the legislature has authorized
transfers of cases in some instances, it might be assumed that the courts' control
over how appeals are allocated inter se ends there. It may be somewhat surprising,
then, that a rule of appellate procedure, Rule 12-102, prescribes the court to which
an appeal should be taken. Rule 12-102 provides:
Appeals; where taken.
A. Supreme Court. The following appeals shall be taken to the Supreme Court:
(1) appeals from the district courts in which a sentence of death or life
imprisonment has been imposed;
(2) appeals from the Public Regulation Commission;
(3) appeals from the granting of writs of habeas corpus; and
(4) appeals in any other matter in which jurisdiction has been specifically
reserved to the Supreme Court by the New Mexico Constitution or by Supreme
Court order or rule.
36
B. Court of Appeals. All other appeals shall be taken to the Court of Appeals.
If this rule was perfectly consistent with the governing statutes, it might serve as
a useful summary of the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions, which vest

30. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 29.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(B) (1983).
See infra Part IV.B.
NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972).
Id. § 34-5-10 (1966).
N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
Rule 12-102 NMRA.
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appellate jurisdiction in one court or the other. Indeed, the first two subdivisions of
the rule could reasonably well serve that purpose. The first more or less tracks the
mandate to the same effect in article VI itself.3 7 The second is consistent with
statutes providing that appeals from the state's principal utility commission, the
Public Regulation Commission, are to be taken to the supreme court.3
This basic congruence between the rule and the applicable statutes ends, however,
with the first two subdivisions. The third, providing that "appeals from the granting
of writs of habeas corpus" should be taken to the supreme court, marks a significant
break from the appellate jurisdiction provided by statute. Section 34-5-14 makes no
provision for supreme court jurisdiction over such appeals. Section 34-5-8 provides
that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals in post-conviction remedy
39
proceedings, except where the sentence involved is death or life imprisonment.
The divergence between rule and statute is most conspicuous in the fourth
subdivision, which provides that appeals should be taken to the supreme court in all
other matters in which jurisdiction is reserved to that court "by the New Mexico
Constitution or by Supreme Court orderor rule," while all remaining appeals should
be taken to the court of appeals.4 This subdivision squarely conflicts with section
34-5-8, which provides that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals in all
civil actions not reserved to the supreme court by the constitution or by law, and
with section 34-5-14, which provides that the supreme court has jurisdiction in all
cases not reserved to the court of appeals by law.4 '
Notably, despite what Rule 12-102 says, the court of appeals does not hear all
appeals other than those specifically reserved to the supreme court by the
constitution or by supreme court order or rule, and the supreme court hears some
appeals, although neither the constitution nor any order or rule reserves jurisdiction
to it. 42 In practice, the courts appear to exercise appellate jurisdiction as authorized

by either a constitutional provision, a statute, a rule, or some combination of these,
although doing so usually conflicts with either the statute or the rule.43

37. See N.M. CONST. art. V1, § 2.
38. NMSA 1978, §§ 62-11-1 (1993), 63-7-1. I(E) (1998), 63-9A-14 (1998). This subdivision of the rule was
amended in 2000, shortly after the Public Regulation Commission was established to replace two predecessor
agencies, the State Corporation Commission and the Public Utility Commission. Until 2000, Rule 12-102 had
provided for supreme court review of decisions of the two predecessor agencies, but that too was consistent with
then-existing constitutional and statutory provisions. See N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (repealed 1999); NMSA 1978,
§§ 62-11-1 (1993), 63-9A-14 (1985).
39. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(4) (1983).
40. Rule 12-102(A)(4), (B) NMRA (emphasis added).
41. NMSA 1978, §§ 34-5-8(A)(1) (1983), 34-5-14(A) (1972).
42. See, e.g., Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, 1 1, 103 P.3d 571, 573 (exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13(C) (1987), "which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court for claims
made under the [New Mexico Human Rights Act]"); Gunaji v. Macias, 2001-NMSC-028, 31 P.3d 1008 (exercising
jurisdiction over appeal in election contest).
43. See, e.g., State v. Forbes, 2005-NMSC-027, 2, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (citing rule for jurisdiction to review
order granting writ of habeas corpus); Nava, 2004-NMSC-039, 1 1, 103 P.3d at 573 (citing statute for jurisdiction
11, 93 P.3d 1272, 1273
to hear appeal under Human Rights Act); Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2004-NMSC-025,
(citing statute and rule for jurisdiction to answer questions certified by federal appeals court); State v. Rosales, 2004, 94 P.3d 768, 769 (citing constitutional provision and rule for jurisdiction to review sentence of life
NMSC-022,
imprisonment); State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, 1 1, 61 P.3d 793, 795 (citing rule for jurisdiction to review

sentence of life imprisonment); Richards v. Allianz Ufe Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2003-NMCA-001, 1 1, 62 P.3d 320,
322 (citing statute for jurisdiction to hear appeal under Uniform Arbitration Act).
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In addition to Rule 12-102, which purports to define the proper court in which to
take appeals generally, several other appellate rules govern appeals in specific
classes of cases. Most of these rules are adequately grounded in constitutional or
statutory authority for the appeals to which they apply. Some rules explicitly cite
relevant statutory authority." Others refer generically to applicable constitutional
or statutory authority.45 Several rules do not explicitly acknowledge such authority
but are consistent with existing statutes. 46 One rule, Rule 12-505, does a little of
each.47
Although most of the appellate rules thus conform closely to, or at least do not
conflict with, the courts' appellate jurisdiction as provided by law, a few rules in
addition to Rule 12-102 purport to grant jurisdiction different from, or in the
absence of, statutory authority. Rule 12-501, governing the supreme court's
discretionary review of orders denying writs of habeas corpus,48 complements Rule
12-102(A)(3), providing for direct appeal to the supreme court of orders granting
habeas relief.49 Rule 12-501 and Rule 12-102(A)(3) are out of step with section 345-8(A)(4) for the same reason. Both rules call for review in the supreme court while
(except in cases involving a sentence of death or life imprisonment) the statute
authorizes review in the court of appeals.50
Rule 12-503 also purports to grant jurisdiction in conflict with an applicable
statute. The rule governs the procedure for writs of error, providing in part that "[a]s
part of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 29," the court of
appeals "is granted authority to issue writs of error" in cases in which it would have
appellate jurisdiction from a final judgment.5' This language conflicts with the court
of appeals' jurisdiction under the statute governing writs of error, which provides
44. Rule 12-603(A) NMRA (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 1-8-18 (1981), 1-8-35 (1985)) (governing appeals in
nomination contests); Rule 12-606 NMRA (citing NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972)) (governing certification of
cases from the court of appeals to the supreme court); Rule 12-608 NMRA (citing NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (1999))
(governing certification of cases from district courts to the court of appeals).
45. Rule 12-601(A) NMRA (governing appeals from actions of administrative bodies or officials "when the
right to a direct appeal is provided by statute"); Rule 12-604(A) NMRA (governing appeals in proceedings for
removal of public officials "where jurisdiction is conferred on the supreme court by the constitution or by statute").
46. Rule 12-502 NMRA (governing writs of certiorari to court of appeals, authorized by NMSA 1978, § 345-14(B) (1972)); Rule 12-602 NMRA (governing appeals from convictions of criminal contempt of the court of
appeals, authorized by NMSA 1978, § 39-3-15(A) (1966)); Rule 12-607 NMRA (governing certification of
questions of law to supreme court, authorized by NMSA 1978, § 39-7-4 (1997)); c Rule 12-504 NMRA (governing
extraordinary writ proceedings, authorized by N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3).
47. Rule 12-505 NMRA. Rule 12-505 addresses certiorari review of district court decisions in administrative
appeals. It cites statutory authority, NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (1999), which gives the court of appeals certiorari
jurisdiction over many, but apparently not all, such appeals. Rule 12-505(A) NMRA; see Dixon v. State Taxation
& Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-044, I 1-10, 89 P.3d 680, 681-83. Two rules of civil procedure, Rule 1-074 and
Rule 1-075, prescribe procedures for district court review of administrative agency decisions as authorized by statute
and by the constitution, respectively, but do not themselves create a right of review. Rules 1-074, 1-075 NMRA.
Rule 12-505 contemplates certiorari review of district court decisions in such appeals, but it likewise does not
purport to create a right of review. Thus, there is no indication that Rule 12-505 purports to confer jurisdiction on
the court of appeals in the absence of, or in conflict with, an applicable statute. Cf. State ex rel. Pilot Dev. Nw., Inc.
v. State Health Planning & Dev. Bureau, 102 N.M. 791,797, 701 P.2d 390, 396 (Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]his court does
not have jurisdiction over an appeal that is not authorized.").
48. Rule 12-501 NMRA (governing "petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari seeking review of denials
of habeas corpus petitions by the district court pursuant to Rule 5-802 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure").
49. Rule 12-102(A)(3) NMRA.
50. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(4) (1983). See generally infra Part IV.C.
51. Rule 12-503(B) NMRA.
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that such writs are to be issued by the supreme court in cases in which the court of
appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction.5 2
In addition, Rule 21-900(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct purports to create
both a right of action in district court and a right of appeal to the supreme court in
favor of a candidate for election to judicial office who wishes to challenge an
opponent's violation of the rules of judicial conduct.53 No statute authorizes the right
of appeal that Rule 21-900(C) creates. Thus, the supreme court's jurisdiction over
such an appeal is provided by rule but not by statute.
To summarize, most of the supreme court's rules are consistent with the
constitutional and statutory provisions providing for the courts' jurisdiction, but a
few are not. We are aware of no court decision or commentary that explains or even
acknowledges the inconsistencies. The way in which these inconsistencies came
about is discernible, however, from the historical record, to which we now turn.
III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION AS PROVIDED BY LAW:
A SHORT HISTORY
A. TerritorialLaw and Its Antecedents
Article VI in its present form finds antecedents at least as far back as the Organic
Act for the Territory of New Mexico,

54

by which the U.S. Congress constituted the

territorial government of New Mexico in 1850. As the fundamental law for the
territory, the Organic Act was a clear break from the Spanish and Mexican forms of
government that preceded it, under which a provincial governor exercised executive,
legislative, judicial, and military powers. 5 Local alcaldes 6 likewise possessed a
combination of these powers and sometimes also clerical authority.57
In contrast, the Organic Act embodied the tripartite separation of powers implicit
in the U.S. Constitution. A distinctive feature of the Federal Constitution is its
express grant to Congress of the power to regulate and limit the U.S. Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Article Iprovides that "the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 58 Congress's authority to make
exceptions and regulations pursuant to this provision has always been understood
to include the power not only to limit the Court's jurisdiction, but also to prescribe
it affirmatively, on the theory that Congress makes exceptions by negative
implication.5

52. NMSA 1978, § 39-3-5 (1966).
53. Rule 21-900(C) NMRA.
54. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 446 [hereinafter Organic Act].
55. See generally HOWARD R. LAMAR, THE FAR SOUTHWEST 1846-1912: A TERRITORIAL HISTORY 21-29
(rev. ed., Univ. of N.M. Press 2000) (1966).
56. An alcalde was a government official at the local or district level. Spanish towns and villages were
governed by alcaldes,who acted as mayor, justice of the peace, probate judge, and sometimes militia captain. These
local officials in turn were under the jurisdiction of district alcaldes.See id. at 27.

57. Id. at 27, 35-36.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
59. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
307, 314 (1810).
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Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized a legislative power to
regulate the courts' appellate jurisdiction, even without reference to the explicit
"exceptions and regulations" authority. In Ex parte Bollman, an 1807 decision, the
Court "disclaim[ed] all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of
the United States."' 6 Chief Justice Marshall explained: "Courts which originate in
the common law possess ajurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law,
until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts which are
created by written law, and' 61whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot
transcendthatjurisdiction.
The Chief Justice distinguished a power of the courts-"the power of courts over
their own officers, or to protect themselves, and their members, from being
disturbed in the exercise of their functions"-separate from theirjurisdiction-"the
power of taking cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the
government and individuals. To enable the court to decide on such question [of the
latter sort], the power to determine it must be given by written law. 62
New Mexico's Organic Act bears some resemblance to Article 11 of the U.S.
Constitution. Where Article 1H provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction subject to exceptions and regulations imposed by Congress, the Organic
Act provided that the courts' jurisdiction was to be "as limited by law" and that
appeals of final decisions of the district courts to the territorial supreme court were
to be allowed "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. 63 The Organic
Act's lineage traces not directly to the Federal Constitution, however, but to a
parallel sequence of statutes enacted by Congress to govern the American
territories.' The earliest eighteenth-century versions of these organic acts did not
explicitly delegate power over the courts to the territorial assemblies. 65 Nevertheless,
the assemblies began assuming "the power to regulate the courts and their
jurisdiction," a legislative power that has been described as deriving from "a sort of
common consent."' This practice was formalized in the 1804 Organic Act for the
Territory of Orleans, which explicitly provided for legislative regulation of the
courts and their jurisdiction. 67 By the time of the 1836 Organic Act for the Territory

60. Exparte BoUman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807); cf. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 321, 327
(1796) ("If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction;
and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it.").
61. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 94.
63. Organic Act, supra note 54, § 10. Section 10 of the Act provided in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that
of the Probate Courts, and of justices of the peace, shall be as limited by law: Provided,
That.. .the said Supreme and District Courts, respectively, shall possess chancery as well as
common law jurisdiction... Writs of error, bills of exception and appeals, shall be allowed in all
cases from the final decisions of said District Courts to the Supreme Court, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, but in no case removed to the Supreme Court shall trial
by jury be allowed in said court.
Id.
64. See MAX FARRAND, THE LEGISLATION OF CONGRESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZED
TERRITORIES OFTHE UNITED STATES: 1789-1895, at 38 (photo. reprint 2000) (1896).
65. See id. at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23, app. B 120.
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of Wisconsin, a model for territorial government had blossomed and was followed
in successive organic acts for territories throughout the American West. 68 The acts
"all contained the same provisions in regard to the legislature and the legislative
authority, and to the judiciary and the judicial authority." 69 They provided in broad
outline for a judiciary for each territory, but left the details of the courts and their
jurisdiction to regulation by the territorial legislatures. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained:
Whenever Congress has proceeded to organize a government for any of the
Territories, it has merely instituted a general system of courts therefor, and has
committed to the Territorial assembly full power, subject to a few specified or
implied conditions, of supplying all details of legislation necessary to put the
system 70into operation, even to the defining of the jurisdiction of the several
courts.

In light of this history, there is no question that New Mexico's Organic Act, the
fifth of seventeen iterations of the Wisconsin model,7' gave the territorial legislature
power to regulate and prescribe the courts' jurisdiction by providing that it was to
be "as limited by law" and that review in the supreme court was to be allowed
"under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. 72 In the 1858 decision
Leitensdorfer v. Webb,73 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled definitively that the words
"as limited by law" vested New Mexico's territorial legislature "with authority to
prescribe the subjects for the cognizance of the courts created by the Act. '74 The
Court confirmed that the legislature was bound to act within the Act's broad
provisions, under which the supreme court alone possessed appellate jurisdiction
and only the lower courts had original jurisdiction? 5 Within those broad outlines,
however, the legislature could supply the details.
Decisions of New Mexico's territorial supreme court were generally consistent
with Leitensdorfer.The court recognized, for example, that "we must look alone to
the several acts of congress, and of our territorial legislature, as defining the extent
of ourjurisdiction. 76 From the beginning, the court affirmed its power to review the
legislature's regulation of its jurisdiction, as it would any other legislative act, by the

68. Id. at 38; see Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 444 (1871).
69. Clinton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 444.
70. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648,655 (1873); see also Ferris v. Higley, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
375, 380-84 (1874) (recognizing that the territorial legislature was bound to define courts' jurisdiction within limits
set by the organic act).
71. See FARRAND, supra note 64, app. A.
72. Organic Act, supra note 54, § 10.
73. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1858).
74. Id. at 182.
75. Id. at 183.
76. Lynch v. Grayson, 7 N.M. 26, 41, 32 P. 149, 154 (1893), afftd, 163 U.S. 468 (1896). But see Jung v.
Myer, I I N.M. 378, 383-84, 68 P. 933, 934-35 (1902) (stating in dicta that the territorial legislature lacked
authority to regulate the courts' jurisdiction because the Organic Act fully defined their jurisdiction).
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yardstick of the fundamental law.77 The court did not intimate, however, that it
might assume the authority to define its own jurisdiction.
The legislature and the supreme court cooperated throughout the territorial period
in establishing rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for the courts.78 Apparently
there was no confrontation between the two branches in this endeavor because the
legislature's predominant authority was accepted. Thus, the legislature enacted rules
of practice and procedure for the courts and also delegated rulemaking authority to
the supreme court. 79 The court for its part explicitly acknowledged that its rulemaking authority was subordinate by noting, for example, that its rules were
promulgated "in perseverances of the directions" of the legislature.8 °
B. Statehood
New Mexico was admitted as the forty-seventh state of the Union in 1912. The
state constitution, approved by the people the year before, has been amended many
times since. But the judicial article, article VI, remains similar in many respects to
its original form. We have noted that the supreme court's original jurisdiction and
superintending control, as conferred by article VI, section 3, have not changed.8
At statehood, as in the territorial period, the supreme court was the only court
empowered to hear appeals and other applications for review of district court
decisions. Section 2 of article VI originally defined the supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction in broad language, extending it to "all final judgments and decisions of
the district courts," as well as to such appeals from district court interlocutory orders
and decisions "as may be conferred by law."82 From a contemporary vantage point,
the expansive language of the original section 2 would seem to accommodate only
a minimal role for the legislature. As the supreme court's jurisdiction over appeals
from final orders was unqualified, the legislature's power to confer or withhold
interlocutory jurisdiction was the exception rather than the rule.
Even without an express limitation on the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction,
however, the court soon concluded that the legislature retained the prerogative to
decide what appeals the court would hear. In the 1914 decision State v. Chacon,83

77. See Territory v. Ortiz, 1 N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 5, 12-13 (1852) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (invalidating statute purporting to grant supreme court original jurisdiction to issue writs

of mandamus because the Organic Act placed mandamus authority within the supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction); Archibeque v. Miera, 1 N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 160, 162 (1857) (holding that Organic Act
empowered legislature to confer appellate, but not original, jurisdiction on supreme court and original, but not
appellate, jurisdiction on other courts).
78. See Michael B. Browde & Mario E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making
Power in New Mexico: The Needfor PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M. L. REv. 407, 412-18 (1985).
79. Id. at 414-18.
80. Id at 416 & n.46 (quoting Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico for the
Regulation of Practice in the Supreme and District Courts in force Jan. 1, 1888. Santa Fe, New Mexican Steam
Printing Co., 1887) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 416-17 & nn.48-53 (discussing rules
promulgated by supreme court to achieve conformity with statute).
81. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
82. The full text of section 2 originally read: "The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court shall be
coextensive with the state, and shall extend to all final judgments and decisions of the district courts, and said court
shall have such appellate jurisdiction of interlocutory orders and decisions of the district courts as may be conferred
by law." Id. § 2 (amended 1965).
83. 19 N.M. 456, 145 P. 125 (1914).
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the supreme court announced that its appellate jurisdiction "may only be invoked
pursuant to a statute conferring the right and prescribing the procedure."' The court
in Chaconunderstood the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments to be plenary, in contrast with its interlocutory jurisdiction, which
comprised only such jurisdiction "as the legislature might see fit to confer upon it."85
A court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal was to be distinguished, however, from a
litigant's right to invoke that jurisdiction by bringing the appeal. The court's
jurisdiction thus would remain "inabeyance" until "given vitality by legislative
authority. ' 86 The court located the legislative prerogative to grant or withhold the
right to appeal not in any constitutional language, but in the notion that appeals are
"creatures of statute.', 87 That notion was in step with the common law of its time and
mirrored a similar conception of Congress's power to regulate the U.S. Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 8 The New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed its
holding in Chacon on many occasions over roughly the three succeeding decades. 9
Other considerations came into play, however, as legislative predominance over
practice and procedure in the courts began to wane. 90 This change first manifested
itself in the passage of the Act of March 13, 193 3, 9' by which the legislature charged
the supreme court with the duty to regulate "pleading, practice and procedure" in the
courts, subject to the condition that such rules not "abridge, enlarge or modify the
substantive rights of any litigant. 9 2 The Act provided that existing statutes relating
to pleading, practice, and procedure should remain in effect as rules of the court, but
only until modified or suspended by supreme court rules.93 Professors Browde and
Occhialino have traced the inspiration for the 1933 Act to the writings and speeches
of Dean Roscoe Pound, who argued that courts are best able to say what procedures
should be followed in their own proceedings, although procedure should always
remain subsidiary to substantive law. 94
The supreme court, in State v. Roy,95 upheld the 1933 Act over a constitutional
challenge, rejecting the contention that the Act delegated an exclusively legislative
function to the judiciary. 96 The court reasoned that it could properly regulate judicial
practice and procedure by virtue of both the power of superintending control granted
84. Id. at 461, 145 P. at 127.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 462, 145 P. at 127 (quoting State ex rel. Milwaukee Med. College v. Chittenden, 107 N.W. 500,
513 (Wis. 1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at461, 145 P. at 127.
88. Id. at 461--64, 145 P. at 127-28 (collecting cases); see, e.g., The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 386
(1882) ("What [the appellate] powers shall be, and to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been,
proper subjects of legislative control.").
89. See, e.g., Inre Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 152, 138 P.2d 503,511(1943); State v. Eychaner, 41 N.M. 677,
683, 73 P.2d 805, 809 (1937); State v. Rosenwald Bros., 23 N.M. 578, 580, 170 P. 42, 43 (1918).
90. See generally Browde & Occhialino, supranote 78, at 412-47 (tracing the evolution of legislative and
judicial participation in rule-making on matters of practice and procedure).
91. Act of March 13, 1933, ch. 84, §§ 1, 2, 1933 N.M. Laws 147, 147-48 (codified as amended at NMSA
1978, §§ 38-1-1 to -2 (1966)).
92. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-1 (1966).
93. Id. § 38-1-2.
94. Browde & Occhialino, supranote 78, at 425-26 & n.1 13; see Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power
of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599,601-02 (1926).
95. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
96. Id. at 418, 60 P.2d at 659.
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by article VI, section 3 and "an inherent power lodged in us." 97 Citing Dean Pound,
the court found that such regulation is inherently judicial and thus not exclusively
legislative, although the court left open the question of whether such regulation is
exclusively judicial.98
The premise of Roy, that practice and procedure are creatures of court rule, was
bound to collide with the premise of Chacon, that appeals are creatures of statute.
The two lines of authority intersected in the 1947 decision State v. A rnold.99 Arnold
presented the question of whether the time for appeal prescribed by a supreme court
rule superseded a longer time prescribed by a statute.It ° Concluding that the rule was
controlling, the supreme court harmonized the doctrines of Roy and Chacon by
declaring that it lacked authority to create a right of appeal but could nonetheless
regulate the exercise of that right by rule.10 ' The court's holding thus rested on a
distinction between substance (the right of appeal) and procedure (the time and
manner of perfecting an appeal):
It may be readily conceded that if the legislature had authorized no appeal, this
court would be powerless to create the right of appeal by rule. The creating of
a right of appeal is a matter of substantive law and outside the province of the
court's rule making power. Nevertheless, once the legislature has authorized the
appeal, reasonable regulations affecting the time and manner of taking and
perfecting the same are procedural and within this court's rule making power. 2
The court in Arnold did not invent this distinction between substance and procedure. The distinction is inherent in the 1933 Act, which empowers the judiciary to
regulate "procedure" in the courts but not to abridge, enlarge, or modify the "substantive" rights of litigants, 0 3 and in Dean Pound's idea that courts can best select
the procedures to govern their own proceedings but those procedures should remain
subordinate to substantive law."°4 But the decision in Arnold broke new ground in
its delineation of the boundary between the legislature's domain, where the basic
right of appeal lies, and the judiciary's domain, where regulations of time, place, and
manner are proper. That demarcation was the state of the law in 1965, some eighteen
years after Arnold, when amendments of the state constitution were proposed. It may
reasonably be presumed that the framers of the 1965 amendments knew and took
account of that existing law.' 05

97. Id. at 420-21, 60 P.2d at 660-61.
98. Id. at 421-23, 60 P.2d at 661-62 (citing Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedureby Rules of
Court, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163 (1915)).
99. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947).
100. Id. at 313, 183 P.2d at 845. The rule authorized an appeal in a civil action within three months from the
entry of a final judgment. NMSA 1941, § 19-201(5)(1) (1935) (codiflying Rule 5(1) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court). The statute authorized an appeal in a civil action within six months from the entry of a final judgment.
NMSA 1929, § 105-2501 (1917).
101. 51 N.M. at314, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
102. Id.; see also Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 260, 149 P.2d 795, 799 (1944) ("'[T]he acts necessary to
give jurisdiction, as specified in an act of the Legislature, cannot be added to or limited by a rule of court."' (quoting
Klokke Inv. Co. v. Superior Ct., 179 P. 728, 729 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. (1919))).
103. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-1(A) (1966).
104. Pound, supra note 94, at 601-02.
105. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. City of Albuquerque, 64 N.M. 427,430,329 P.2d 626,628 (1958) (presuming that
the constitution's framers had notice of other states' similar constitutional provisions and interpretations given
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C. The 1965 Amendments
As New Mexico's population grew over the years, so did its litigation.' 1°
Ineluctably, the supreme court fell behind on its caseload, and by the early 1960s,
various court reform efforts were undertaken to address the problem. 10 7 One such
effort was a proposal to create an intermediate court of appeals. 10 8 To do that,
however, would require an amendment of article VI. A constitutional amendment
would be necessary both to conferjudicial power on the new court and to define the
jurisdiction conferred. An amended article VI could delegate the task of defining the
new court's jurisdiction, but that possibility posed the question of which body, the
legislature or the supreme court, should carry out the task. As of then, it was always
the legislature that had prescribed the courts' jurisdiction when the fundamental law
did not.' 9 Intellectual currents of the time put that time-honored practice to test,
however, as well-respected constituencies argued that state supreme courts should
define their jurisdiction as an incident of their rule-making powers." 0 The framers
of the 1965 amendments ultimately chose to leave in the legislature the power to
define the courts' appellatejurisdiction."' The historical context in which they acted
underscores the significance of that choice.
As the court reform initiative gathered momentum in New Mexico, considerable
public attention and discussion surrounded the proposal to revamp the constitution's
judicial article. Comparative analyses of model and existing constitutional provisions circulated." 2 The legislature established the Constitutional Revision Commission in 1963 for the purpose of recommending changes in the state constitution."l 3 The Commission met with various groups and individuals in New Mexico
and worked closely with members of the judiciary and the New Mexico State Bar
Association. A particularly important event in which the Commission participated
was a three-day citizens' conference in June 1964,' where the conferees were
presented with pertinent provisions of the Model Judicial Article for State
Constitutions, recently published by the American Bar Association and the
American Judicature Society."'

them).
106. Thomas A. Donnelly & Pamela B. Minzner, History of the New Mexico Court of Appeals, 22 N.M. L.
REv. 595,595-96 (1992).
107. Id. at 597-98.
108. Id.; see N.M. Const. Revision Comm'n, Why the Adoption of an Intermediate Court of Appeals Is
Necessary in the State of New Mexico (unpublished memorandum) (on file with the New Mexico Legislative
Council Service Library).
109. See supraPart Ill.A-B.
110. See infra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 125-149 and accompanying text.
112. League of Women Voters of N.M., An Exploration of the Constitution of New Mexico-The Judicial
Article--A Comparative Chart (June 1964) (unpublished memorandum) (on file with the University of New Mexico
School of Law Library); League of Women Voters of N.M., State Constitutions-Their Judiciary Articles (1959/61)
(unpublished memorandum) (on file with the New Mexico Legislative Council Service Library).
113. See Act ofMarch 20, 1963, ch. 223, § 3, 1963 N.M. Laws 433, 434.
114. N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, 1964 REPORT OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, at vii

[hereinafter 1964 REPORT].
115. Joint Comm. for Effective Admin. of Justice et al., A Citizens' Conference on New Mexico Courts:
Reading Materials (June 11-13, 1964) (on file with the New Mexico State Archives); see also infra note 120.
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The Model Judicial Article is the key to the drafting history of the 1965
amendments of article VI. Written during the period of time from 1959 to 1962 by
an American Bar Association committee chaired by Justice Tom C. Clark," 6 it
followed on the heels of attempts by some in Congress in the late 1950s to withdraw
the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in entire classes of cases." 7 The
proposed legislation initially targeted Warren Court decisions perceived to threaten
national security and accommodate subversion but also drew support from
opponents of the Court's decisions in school desegregation cases."' These efforts,
which the American Bar Association actively opposed, eventually failed, but they
were widely viewed as the most serious threat of congressional retaliation against
the Court since the Reconstruction era. 1'9 The propounding of the Model Judicial
Article, initiated just a year after this controversy, undoubtedly aimed to protect the
courts' independence and to insulate them from legislative meddling.
The Model JudicialArticle vests extensive rule-making power in the judiciary.
It empowers the supreme court "to prescribe rules governing appellate jurisdiction,
rules of practice and procedure, and rules of evidence, for the judicial system," as
well as rules governing admission to the bar and discipline of members of the bar. 2 '
The Model JudicialArticle provides that, in most cases, the supreme court and the
court of appeals are to exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and
conditions as the supreme court shall specify in its rules; it also empowers the
supreme court to issue writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and to authorize the
court of appeals, by rule, to do the same. 2 '

116. Ivan Lee Holt, Jr., The Model Judicial Article in Perspective, 47 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 6, 8 (1963);
Glenn R. Winters, A.B.A. House of Delegates Approves Model Judicial Article for State Constitutions, 45 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'Y 279, 279 (1962).
117. See Shelden D. Elliott, Court-CurbingProposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 597, 598-602
(1958).
118. GERALD GuNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 660 (1994).
119. Id. at 660-62; see generally Elliott, supranote 117.
120. MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONS § 9 (1962) [hereinafter MODEL JUDICIAL
ARTICLE], reprinted in Holt, supra note 116, at 8-12.
121. Id. §§ 2, 3, 9. The model section on the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, with the language
on which New Mexico's amended article VI, section 2 is patterned in italics, is as follows:
Appeals from a judgment of the District Court imposing a sentence of death or life
imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of 25 years or more, shall be taken directly to the
Supreme Court.In all other cases, criminaland civil, the Supreme Court shall exerciseappellate
jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as it shall specify in rules, except that such rules
shall provide that a defendant shall have an absolute right to one appeal in all criminal cases.
On all appeals authorized to be taken to the Supreme Court in criminal cases, that Court shall
have the power to review all questions of law and, to the extent provided by rule, to review and
revise the sentence imposed.
Id. § 2.B (emphasis added). The model section on the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is as follows, with the
language on which article VI, section 29 is patterned in italics:
The Court of Appeals shall consist of as many divisions as the Supreme Court shall determine
to be necessary. Each division of the Court of Appeals shall consist of three judges. The Court
of Appeals shall have no originaljurisdiction,except that it may be authorizedby rules of the
Supreme Court to review directly decisions of administrativeagencies of the State and it may
be authorizedby rules of the Supreme Court to issue all writs necessary or appropriatein aid
of its appellatejurisdiction.In all othercases, it shall exercise appellatejurisdiction under such
terms and conditions as the Supreme Court shall specify by rules which shall, however, provide
that a defendant shall have an absolute right to one appeal in all criminal cases and which may
include the authority to review and revise sentences in criminal cases.
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Committee commentary accompanying the model provisions made the case for
empowering the supreme court to prescribe appellate jurisdiction as part of its rulemaking power:
On the question of whether this allocation of [the appellate] power should be in
the Court or in the legislature, the Committee chose the Court for several
reasons. Among others, these reasons included: 1)the fact that such power in the
Court would enhance the independence of the judiciary; 2) the fact that it would
place the power to meet current problems in the hands of those most likely to be
expert in the subject; 3) the fact that the rule making power was more flexible
than the legislative power in its capacity to meet the demands of judicial
administration.'22
The commentary also invoked Dean Pound's arguments for assigning the power
to make rules of practice and procedure to the courts---the same arguments that had
inspired New Mexico's legislature and supreme court to recognize a judicial rulemaking power during the 1930s. 123 Thus, subsuming the authority to prescribe
appellate jurisdiction under the rule-making power apparently was rationalized on
the basis that jurisdiction is a matter of procedure. 24
In New Mexico, the work of drafting a proposed new judicial article fell initially
to Thomas A. Donnelly, then counsel to the Constitutional Revision Commission
and later a judge on the court of appeals. Judge Donnelly, who had participated in
the citizens' conference at which the Model JudicialArticle was presented, created
a draft loosely patterned after that document.'25 His draft departed from the Model
Judicial Article, however, in one particularly notable way. It proposed that the
courts' jurisdiction be as provided by law rather than by court rule, with two
exceptions-the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review administrative agency
decisions and
to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction might be provided either by law
126
or by rule.

Although Judge Donnelly followed the Model JudicialArticle to a significant
extent, at least one proponent of the Model JudicialArticle in New Mexico believed
that Judge Donnelly's draft did not follow it as closely as it should have. Justice
David W. Carmody, a pioneer in New Mexico's court reform efforts, 127 submitted
a spirited critique of Judge Donnelly's draft. Justice Carmody observed that the draft
appeared to "vary from the model judicial article in reposing in the Legislature a
great many of the implementation provisions as distinguished from allowing the
Supreme Court to take care of these matters by rule."' 28 He emphasized that "this

Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
122. Id. § 2.B cmt.; see id § 3 cmt. ("The same reasons exist for allotting the power to the supreme court
rather than the legislature to specify the jurisdiction.").
123. Id. §§ 1, 9 cmts.; see Holt, supra note 116, at 6; see also supranotes 94-98 and accompanying text.
124. See Winters, supra note 116, at 280 ("The grant of rule-making power includes trial practice and
procedure, appellate jurisdiction, and rules of evidence, as well as admission to the bar and discipline of members
of the bar.").
125. Minutes of the Meeting of the N.M. Constitutional Revision Comm'n 2-3 (July 17, 1964) (on file with
the New Mexico State Archives).
126. Id. add. §§ 3,7,8 (proposed Judicial Article of New Mexico State Constitution).
127. See Donnelly & Minzner, supra note 106, at 596.
128. Letter from Justice David W. Carmody to Edward E. Triviz, Chairman of the Constitutional Revision
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goes to the very foundation of any change in our present system, and the authorities
on the subject are unanimous that, in view of the separation of powers of the three
' ' 29
branches of government, the Judicial Branch should operate as one separate unit.
He noted that the legislature already had "absolute control over appropriations" and
"final say as to finances," and added, "I firmly believe that the Court is in a much
superior position to determine what may be necessary" in regard to the judiciary's
operations. 130 He offered a section-by-section commentary on Judge Donnelly's
draft, urging adherence to the language and organization of the Model Judicial
Article "as to the.. .appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" and other provisions
for the supreme court's rule-making power. 13' He maintained that the courts'
jurisdiction "should be controlled by rule of the Supreme Court, rather than
statute."'' 32 Accordingly, he recommended changing the phrase "provided
' 33 by law"
in Judge Donnelly's draft to "provided by rule of the Supreme Court.'
In a report adopted on September 29, 1964, the Constitutional Revision
Commission published a proposed judicial article incorporating Judge Donnelly's
draft with only minor changes. 3' The Commission acknowledged the constructive
assistance of Justice Carmody, as well as that of a special committee of the New
Mexico State Bar Association, 35 but it retained the language specifying that the
courts' appellate jurisdiction should be as provided by law, or in a few cases, as
provided by law or by court rule. 136 Accompanying commentary explained that the
Commission's recommendations were "designed to meet the proposals of the
American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society for judicial reform"
and cited Dean Pound with approval. 37 Nonetheless, the commentary, like the text
of the proposed judicial article, generally reflects the view that
the legislature should
38
1
jurisdiction.
their
and
courts
the
regulate
to
authority
have
The proposed judicial article as introduced in the state senate was substantially
similar to that published in the Constitutional Revision Commission's 1964 Report,
except that it went even further than the Commission in reaffirming the legislature's
authority to provide by law for the courts' jurisdiction. Where the Commission's
proposal (incorporating Judge Donnelly's draft) had allowed that the court of
appeals could be authorized either by law or by rule to review administrative agency
decisions and to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction, 139 the senate bill provided for
such authority by law only. "o The bill underwent three amendments as legislators

Comm'n, and Ellis L. Stout, Vice-Chairman of the Constitutional Revision Comm'n 1 (July 24, 1964) (on file with
the New Mexico State Archives).
129. Id.
130. Id
131. Id. add. 3 (commenting on section 3 of Judge Donnelly's proposed article).
132. Id. add. 4 (commenting on section 8 of Judge Donnelly's proposed article).
133. See id.
134. 1964 REPORT, supranote 114, at 23-33 (proposing a revised article VI of the New Mexico Constitution).
135. Id. at vii.
136. Id. art. VI, §§ 3, 7, 8, at 24, 26.
137. Id. art. VI, § 1 cmt., at 23.
138. See id. art. VI, §§ 3, 7-10 cmts., at 24-27 (commenting that issue of whether to establish court of appeals
and other basic questions of judiciary's organization are left for state legislature's determination).
139. See id. art. VL, § 7, at 26.
140. S.J. Res. 5, 27th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1, at 3 (N.M. 1965).
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considered whether to give the supreme court some rule-making discretion in
allocating appeals between itself and the court of appeals. In particular, one
proposed amendment would have retained the mandate that the court of appeals'
jurisdiction shall be "as provided by law" but would have added that "[t]he supreme
court may, by rule, allocate appeals between the supreme court and the court of
appeal and provide for further appeal from the court of appeal to the supreme court
but retained
in its discretion."'' The successive amendments dropped this proposal
42
the mandate that the courts' jurisdiction be as provided by law.
The amended bill approved by the legislature 43 was far less extensive a reform
than the Constitutional Revision Commission had proposed. The Commission had
sought the repeal of all twenty-seven of the then-existing sections of article VI and
the adoption in their place of twenty-three new sections patterned loosely after the
Model JudicialArticle.44 In contrast, the constitutional amendments submitted by
the legislature for the people's approval consisted of only a minor change to section
1 (extending the state's judicial power to "a court of appeals"), the rewriting of
section 2, and the addition of new sections 28 and 29. Section 28 sets out operational
requirements for the court of appeals, including the number, qualifications, quorum,
and method of selection of judges. 41 Sections 2 and 29 define the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court and the court of appeals, respectively.'" These
sections are unmistakably derived from sections 2.B and 3 of the Model Judicial
Article.147 Notably, unlike some of the proposals in the legislature, section 29
follows the Model JudicialArticle in delegating to the supreme court the power to
48
make rules authorizing the court of appeals to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction.
Sections 2 and 29 differ from the Model JudicialArticle, however, in one critical
respect. In all cases other than those involving a sentence of death or life
imprisonment, the appellate jurisdiction of the two courts is "as may be provided by
law" and not, as in the Model JudicialArticle, under such terms and conditions as
the supreme court shall specify by rule.' 49
Analyses written shortly after the legislature approved these provisions for the
people's consideration indicate that the language "as may be provided by law" was
immediately understood to mean as provided by the legislature. The Constitutional
Revision Commission commented that "[t]he proposal would create a court of
appeals possessing.. .such appellate jurisdiction as may be invested in such court by
the state legislature."' 50 A legislative study committee similarly observed that the
appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals "will be prescribed by law" and "[tihe

141.
142.
27th Leg.,
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

S. Rules Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 5, 27th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1, at 3 (N.M. 1965).
H. Judiciary Comm. Substitute for S. Floor Substitute 1 for S. Rules Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 5,
1st Sess. § 4, at 2 (N.M. 1965).
Constitutional Amendment No. 5,1965 N.M. Laws 1527, 1527-28.
1964 REPORT, supra note 114, at 23-33.
N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
Id. art. VI, §§ 2, 29.
See supra note 121.
N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
Compare id. §§ 2, 29, with MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE §§ 2.B, 3, quoted supra note 121.

150. N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, SYNOPSIS OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PASSED BY

TWENTY-SEVENTH NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE 12 (1965) (on file with the New Mexico Legislative Council Service
Library).
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legislature may also authorize
the court of appeals to review decisions of
151
administrative agencies."'
The people approved the amendments of article VI by a substantial margin in
September 1965. There have since been opportunities to amend article VI again. The
Constitutional Revision Commission issued a report in 1966 essentially renewing
the recommendations in the 1964 Report.'52 These recommendations were
incorporated in part in a proposed new constitution adopted at a constitutional
convention in 1969.153 The people rejected the proposed constitution, however, in
December 1969. While article VI has since been amended in a few details not
pertinent here, sections 2 and 29 remain as the people approved them in 1965.
To summarize, three basic propositions are to be gleaned from the history of
today's article VI. First, the legislature's authority to regulate the courts' appellate
jurisdiction has been recognized for over two centuries. Second, the right of appeal
has been viewed as a matter of legislative prerogative even in the absence of an
explicit constitutional directive. Third, in conceiving the 1965 amendments of article
VI, the framers thoughtfully and deliberately determined that the courts' appellate
jurisdiction should be as the legislature says, and the people of New Mexico ratified
that determination when they approved the amendments. We now consider the
extent to which the supreme court's rules conform to the constitutional regime.
IV. APPELLATE JURISDICTION SINCE 1965
A. Evolution of Rule 12-102
While the New Mexico Supreme Court has promulgated rules of practice and
procedure since before statehood,"M in the wake of the 1965 amendments it
apparently saw little need to revise or expand its rules to govern the court of appeals.
As of April 1, 1966, when the new court was activated, the supreme court
announced that its existing rules of procedure were applicable "in so far as
pertinent"'' l5 in the new court, and soon afterwards it promulgated rules governing56
petitions for writs of certiorari to, and certifications from, the court of appeals.
The supreme
court did not adopt comprehensive rules for the new court, however,
57
until 1974.1
Questions inevitably arose over which was the proper court to hear a given
appeal. 5 8 Nevertheless, the supreme court did not use its rule-making power to
authorize appeals or assign appellate jurisdiction, presumably because (if it thought

151. PHILIP T. MANLY, STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM STUDY COMM., SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NEW
MExICO 3 (1965) (on file with the New Mexico Supreme Court Library).
152. N.M. CONST. REVISIONCOMM'N, REPORTOFTHECONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION 75-99 (1966)
(on file with the New Mexico Legislative Council Service Library); cf 1964 REPORT, supra note 114, at 23-33.
153. N.M. LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., PROPOSED NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION 27-35 (1969).
154. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

155. NMSA 1953, § 21-2-2 (1966).
156. Id. §§ 21-2-1(29) (1966) (governing petitions for writs of certiorari to court of appeals), 21-2-1(30)
(1966) (governing certification of matters to supreme court by court of appeals).
157.

See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.

158. See infra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

about the issue at all) it considered that purpose to be served by statutes, including
those enacted in 1966.15 9
In 1974, the supreme court revised its rules of appellate procedure extensively
and reissued them as Supreme Court Rules 1 through 32.'60 The new rules did not
purport to prescribe the jurisdiction of either appellate court, providing only that an
appeal was to be taken "to the appropriate appellate court."'' Indeed, the supreme
court evidently was mindful that the constitution left the definition of the courts'
appellate jurisdiction to the legislature because its new rules prudently cautioned
that they should "not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the appellate
courts as established by law."'' 62 One year later, the court adopted a separate set of
rules of appellate procedure for criminal cases and restricted the 1974 rules to civil
appeals, special statutory proceedings, and original proceedings. 163 Again the court
admonished that the rules should not be construed to extend or limit the appellate
jurisdiction "as established by law."'('
Notwithstanding these prudent acknowledgments of the legislature's authority,
other developments in 1975 charted a new direction for the supreme court's rules.
165
As we shall elaborate in our discussion of post-conviction remedy proceedings,
a new rule of criminal procedure among the 1975 revisions departed in a subtle but
significant way from the statutes providing for the courts' jurisdiction. 166 More
conspicuously, in 1975 and 1976, the supreme court issued two decisions holding
that the power to make rules governing practice and procedure in the courts is
exclusively as well as inherently judicial. The 1975 decision State ex rel. Anaya v.
McBride 67 invalidated a statute requiring a quo warranto petition 16 to name the
person rightfully entitled to office because the court deemed the statute inconsistent
with a rule of appellate procedure. 69 In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc.,'170 decided in 1976, the court invalidated a statutory privilege on the ground that
it was inconsistent with the court's rules of evidence.' 7' Both decisions predicated
the court's rule-making power on two constitutional provisions: (1) the separationof-powers mandate in article Ill, section 1, and (2) the power of superintending
control in article VI, section 3.172

159. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
160. NMSA 1953, §§ 21-12-1 to -32 (1974).
161. Id. § 21-12-3(a).
162. Id. § 21-12-1(b); accordE. Indem. Co. v. Heller, 102 N.M. 144, 146,692 P.2d 530,532 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the supreme court did not purport to confer right of appeal or extend or limit the court's appellate
jurisdiction through its rules "because the right of appeal is a matter of substantive law and outside the Supreme
Court's rule making power"); Durand v. N.M. Comm'n on Alcoholism, 89 N.M. 434,435, 553 P.2d 714, 715 (Ct.
App. 1976) (holding the same).
163. See NMSA 1953, §§ 21-12-1(a) (1975), 41-23A-101(a) (1975).

164. Id. § 41-23A-101(b).
165. See infra Part IV.C.
166. See NMSA 1953, § 41-23-57 (1975).
167. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
168. A quo warranto proceeding addresses whether a public officer is legally authorized to hold the office
that he or she occupies. Id. at 247, 539 P.2d at 1009.
169. Id.at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008.
170. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
171. id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
172. Id.; McBride, 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008.
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In 1983, the supreme court issued a miscellaneous order, which for the first time
prescribed which classes of appeals should be taken to the supreme court and which
should be taken to the court of appeals.' The 1983 order included a catch-all
provision, designating for supreme court review "appeals in any other matter in
which jurisdiction has been specifically reserved to the New Mexico supreme court
by the New Mexico constitution or by any other specific provision of state law."' 74
By its explicit reference to the constitution or state law, this portion of the order was
consistent with the court's authority as provided by law.
In 1986, the supreme court undertook another extensive revision of its procedural
rules, republishing them in a comprehensive set entitled the Supreme Court Rules
Annotated. 75 Rule 12-102, entitled "Appeals; where taken," first appeared in this
new set of rules. 76 Rule 12-102 adopted almost verbatim the court's 1983 Order,
with one important exception: whereas the 1983 Order had reserved jurisdiction in
the supreme court according to "specific provision of state law,"'177 the rule now
reserved jurisdiction according to "supreme court order or rule.' 78 The 1986
revisions also omitted the admonitions in the 1974 and 1975 rules that those rules
should not be construed to extend or limit the courts' appellate jurisdiction as
established by law. 179 The 1986 revisions thus rejected prior versions of the court's
rules that explicitly acknowledged the legislature's role in defining the courts'

173. N.M. Sup. Ct. Order, No. 8000 Misc. (Apr. 21, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Order]. The order provided in
material part:
IT IS ORDERED that effective June 17, 1983, the following appeals shall be filed in the New
Mexico supreme court:
appeals from the district courts of this state in which one or more counts of the complaint
alleges a breach of contract or otherwise sounds in contract;
appeals from the district courts of this state in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment
has been imposed;
appeals from the public service commission;
appeals from the corporation commission;
appeals from the granting of writs of habeas corpus; and
appeals in any other matter in which jurisdiction has been specifically reserved to the New
Mexico supreme court by the New Mexico constitution or by any other specific provision of
state law.
Id.
174. Id.
175. See State v. Sandoval, 2003-NMSC-027, 1 9, 78 P.3d 907, 910.
176. Rule 12-102 NMRA (1986). As adopted in 1986, the rule provided:
A. Supreme court. The following appeals shall be taken to the supreme court:
(1) appeals from the district courts in which one or more counts of the complaint alleges a
breach of contract or otherwise sounds in contract;
(2) appeals from the district courts in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment has
been imposed;
(3) appeals from the Public Service Commission;
(4) removals from the State Corporation Commission;
(5) appeals from the granting of writs of habeas corpus; and
(6) appeals in any other matter in which jurisdiction has been specifically reserved to the
supreme court by the New Mexico Constitution or by supreme court order or rule.
B. Court of Appeals. All other appeals shall be taken to the court of appeals.
Id.
177. 1983 Order, supra note 173.
178. Rule 12-102(A)(6) NMRA (1986).
179. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction. The 1986 rules asserted a general power in the supreme court to extend
or limit the courts' appellate jurisdiction and even to establish it in the first instance.
Although the justification for these changes was not stated, we surmise that the
court had in mind the inherent authority doctrine of McBride and Ammerman, under
which any conflict between court rules and statutes on a matter of procedure is to
be resolved in favor of the rules.' 80 The supreme court's inherent authority could
justify the 1986 revisions, however, only if the courts' appellate jurisdiction was a
matter of procedure, a notion that Ammerman itself undermines. Ammerman
declares that, subject to the usual exception for sentences of death or life
imprisonment, "[u]nquestionably the Legislature has the power to determine in what
district court cases, civil and criminal, this court shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction."' t8 ' It might be argued that the title of Rule 12-102, "Appeals; where
taken," suggests a concern only with the manner of taking and perfecting an appeal,
not the court's jurisdiction over it, as a litigant cannot very well take an appeal
without knowing the proper court in which to file it. But to say that an appeal should
be taken to a particular court necessarily implies a determination that the court has
the jurisdiction to hear it. The text of the rule bearsi 2out that conclusion, as it speaks
of the court's reservationofjurisdiction to itself.
The inherent authority doctrine as conceived in McBride and Ammerman has been
roundly criticized.183 Whatever one may say about the doctrine as a justification for
the primacy of judicial rule-making, however, the court in Ammerman was surely
correct in concluding that the legislature retains the power to decide the extent of the
courts' appellate jurisdiction. At bottom, the doctrine is grounded in powers inferred
from the constitution itself, namely, the separation-of-powers mandate and the
supreme court's power of superintending control.'" Those provisions should be read
in harmony with, not in derogation of, the more explicit directives in article VI,
sections
2 and 29 that the courts' appellate jurisdiction is as may be provided by
85
law.

Since 1986, Rule 12-102 has been amended in a few of its details. As we shall
explain, it was amended in 1995 to return appeals in contract cases to the court of
appeals. 86 It was amended again in 2000 to cover appeals from the Public
Regulation Commission, which replaced two predecessor agencies. 87 These
amendments are adequately grounded in the governing statutes. Rule 12-102

180. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
181. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 312, 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976).
182. Rule 12-102(A)(6) NMRA (1986) (directing that appeals be taken to the supreme court in matters "in
which jurisdiction has been specifically reserved to the supreme court.. .by supreme court order or rule").
183. See Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 37-43, 791 P.2d 788, 791-97 (1990) (Montgomery, J., dissenting);
Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 201-02, 755 P.2d 40, 45-46 (1988) (Scarborough, C.J.,
dissenting); Browde & Occhialino, supra note 78, at 437-47; Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLtIM. L. REv. 905, 925-26 (1976).
184. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311,551 P.2d at 1358; State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246,539
P.2d 1006, 1008 (1975).
185. See, e.g., Block v. Vigil-Giron, 2004-NMSC-003, 1 9, 84 P.3d 72, 76 ("[W]e interpret constitutional
provisions as a harmonious whole....").
186. See infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 38.
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continues to assert a power in the supreme court, however, to reserve jurisdiction to
itself or to the court of appeals. 88
That asserted power, moreover, is no mere abstraction. There have been several
instances over the last three decades in which the supreme court has undertaken to
decide which court will hear appeals in a specific class of cases. In the first,
involving appeals in contract cases, the court properly exercised statutory authority
to transfer a class of cases to itself. In three other instances, the court's decision to
provide by rule for the courts' appellate jurisdiction cannot be similarly justified.
We turn now to an examination of supreme court rules directing that specific classes
of appeals be heard in one court or the other.
B. Appeals in Contract Cases
Until 1995, the supreme court heard appeals in cases in which the complaint
sounded in contract. 8 9 It continued to do so even after the legislature, in 1983,
expanded the court of appeals' jurisdiction as defined in section 34-5-8 to cover
''any civil action not specifically reserved to the jurisdiction of the supreme court by
the constitution or by law."'" We have noted that the supreme court accomplished
this result simply by decreeing that appeals in contract cases should be taken to it.'9'
This may at first seem puzzling. How could the court exercise jurisdiction over
contract cases when a statute explicitly assigned appeals in all civil cases to the court
of appeals? Admittedly, this question is of primarily historical interest because the
court of appeals now handles contract-case appeals in the ordinary course. But the
answer remains significant because it illustrates how cases can be reassigned from
the court of appeals to the supreme court in a manner consistent with both courts'
jurisdiction as provided by law.
The year 1983 saw a reprise of the problem of a growing caseload-the same
problem that had led to the creation of the court of appeals two decades earlier."
Over the years, the court of appeals met the challenge of a still-increasing caseload
in various ways-many of them innovative, most of them quite effective-including
expansion of the court's membership, employment of staff attorneys, and a summary
calendar system.' 93 But while the court of appeals' capacity to decide cases thus
increased, no similar innovations were made at the supreme court, and the burden
on the high court remained. The prevailing belief in 1966 appears to have been that
the overall appellate caseload should be divided more or less equally between the
two courts."9 The objective in 1983 was to redistribute some of the burden from the

188. Rule 12-102(A)(4) NMRA.
189. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 151, 152, 899 P.2d 594, 595 (1995); Solon v. WEK
Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 566 n.l, 829 P.2d 645, 645 n.1 (1992); Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. 33, 35,627 P.2d 875,
877 (1981); cf. In re Estate of Bergman, 107 N.M. 574, 576, 761 P.2d 452, 454 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that
the supreme court has "reserved jurisdiction over appeals from the district courts in which one or more counts of
the complaint allege a breach of contract or otherwise sound in contract"). Since an amendment of Rule 12-102 in
1995, the court of appeals has heard contract-case appeals. See infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
190. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(1) (1983).
191. See supra note 173.
192. Donnelly & Minzner, supra note 106, at 595-98.
193. Id. at 603-13.
194. Id. at 602 ("The original intent of the legislature appears to have been to divide the appellate caseload
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supreme court to the court of appeals and to find a means of equilibrating the two
courts' workloads going forward.
Legislation to accomplish this objective was proposed in two memoranda
authored by Art Encinias, then counsel to the Administrative Office of the Courts,
later a judge of the District Court for the First Judicial District.195 Judge Encinias'
analysis is notable for its unflinching recognition of the constitutional constraints on
any alteration of the two courts' jurisdiction and its ingenuity in proposing a means
of managing the appellate workload within those constraints. He noted that the
"New Mexico Constitution establishes the broad outlines for jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and leaves much room for the Legislature
to define in greater detail the sphere of each court's influence." 196 He thus read the
constitutional directive that appellate jurisdiction shall be "as may be provided by
law" to mean "as the Legislature determines."197
Given these constitutional limitations, the question was how best to address the
recurring problem of imbalances in the courts' workloads. The suggestion had been
made that "the legislature consider granting the Supreme Court the power to assign
'
The preferred solution, however, was to "honor the
jurisdiction by rule."198
constitutional mandates."1 99 The legislature could continue to amend the
jurisdictional statutes on a piecemeal basis, but that approach was inflexible and
potentially would require legislative action every few years. 2°° Judge Encinias
proposed instead that the legislature take two actions: (1) expand the court of
appeals' jurisdiction to encompass essentially all civil cases as well as appeals from
all of the state's administrative agencies, and (2) create a "transfer mechanism" to
"vest the Supreme [C]ourt with the ability to apportion the appellate workload by
court rule.",20 ' This statutory authority would "provide the needed flexibility in the
courts" to control the appellate workload, such that, "[s]hould the Court of Appeals
find itself overwhelmed by its case load," the supreme court could "more equitably"
redistribute the appellate burden.20 2 In addition, the statutory scheme would "retain
legislative control over general appellate jurisdiction. 2 3 In short, much of the
supreme court's appellate caseload (then an estimated 220 of 647 cases filed in the
last year) would be reassigned to the court of appeals' jurisdiction, but the supreme
court would have discretion immediately to transfer back to itself some of the cases
within that expanded jurisdiction. 2 4

approximately equally between the court of appeals and the state supreme court.").
195. See Art Encinias, A Proposal to Redistribute Jurisdiction in the Appellate Courts (unpublished
memorandum) [hereinafter Encinias ], in FISCAL IMPACr REPORT, supra note 26; Art Encinias, A Proposal to Redistribute Appellate Jurisdiction Between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals (unpublished memorandum)
[hereinafter Encinias U], in FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 26.
196. Encinias I, supra note 195, at 9.
197. Id. at 1.
supra note 195, at 2.
198. Encinias I1,
199. Id.
Encinias I, supra note 195, at 10-11.
200. Id.;
201. Encinias I, supra note 195, at 10; Encinias I1,supra note 195, at 1-2.
202. Encinias II, supra note 195, at 2.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1;Encinias I, supra note 195, at 3, 9-11.
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The legislature and the supreme court, through coordinated action, reached
exactly the result that Judge Encinias had proposed. The legislature amended section
34-5-8 to extend the court of appeals' jurisdiction to "any civil action not
specifically reserved to the jurisdiction of the supreme court by the constitution or
by law. 20 5 In addition, the legislature added new subsection (B), which authorizes
or decision enumerated
the supreme court to "provide for the transfer of any
2 °6 action
in this section" from the court of appeals to itself.
The supreme court, for its part, issued the 1983 Order, in which it enumerated the
classes of appeals to be filed with it. 2°7 The first such category was "appeals from
the district courts of this state in which one or more counts of the complaint alleges
a breach of contract or otherwise sounds in contract."20 8 The court made the order
effective concurrent with the amendment of section 34-5-8, leaving no doubt that
the statute and order were a coordinated effort to reallocate jurisdiction between the
two courts. 209 The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction over civil actions generally,
but all contract cases were immediately transferred to the supreme court.
Were it not for the legislative history of section 34-5-8, one might question
whether the authority to transfer "any action or decision" extends to a wholesale
transfer of an entire class of cases, as opposed to case-by-case transfers in specific
matters. The two pre-existing transfer statutes plainly envision transfers only of the
latter sort. 210 Yet the purpose of section 34-5-8(B), as evinced by the events leading
to its enactment, is precisely to permit redistribution of cases in substantial numbers
to better manage the overall appellate caseload. The supreme court carried out that
purpose when it announced that it would continue hearing appeals in contract cases
notwithstanding the court of appeals' newly acquired jurisdiction over civil actions.
Although one might infer from an isolated reading of the 1983 Order that the court
was providing for its own jurisdiction, its continued exercise of jurisdiction over
contract cases had an adequate basis in statute. That is, it was as "provided by law"
as article VI requires.
The supreme court continued to hear appeals in contract cases until 1995.
Between 1983 and 1995, the court of appeals' membership expanded to ten judges
and progress continued to be made in the management of its caseload.21' Writing in
1992, Judges Donnelly and Minzner summarized the situation:
Appeals from district court decisions involving contracts constitute the last
remaining major area of appellate jurisdiction retained by the supreme court. It
is probable that within the next several years these cases will be transferred to
the court of appeals and the supreme court will become more nearly a court of
and
last resort, reviewing decisions of the court of appeals by writ of certiorari
22
those other cases reserved to the supreme court by the state constitution. '

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(1) (1983).
Id. § 34-5-8(B).
1983 Order, supra note 173.
Id.
See id.
NMSA 1978, §§ 34-5-10 (1966), 34-5-14(C) (1972).
Donnelly & Minzner, supra note 106, at 613-15.
Id. at 615.
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These words proved prescient. In 1994, Rule 12-102 was amended to provide for
the transfer to the court of appeals, upon that court's request, of individual appeals
in contract cases. 13 One year later, the direction that such appeals be taken to the
supreme court was withdrawn in its entirety. The 1994 provision for transfer of
individual appeals to the court of appeals was withdrawn as well.21a Because Rule
12-102 provided, as it always had, that "[a]ll other appeals shall be taken to the
Court of Appeals, 215 the withdrawal of the references to appeals in contract cases
meant that they were thereafter to be taken to the court of appeals.
We presume that, in this instance too, the supreme court was acting pursuant to
section 34-5-8(B) to transfer cases-or, more precisely, to stop transferring them.
The statute authorizes transfer only "from the court of appeals to the supreme
court, ' ' 2 " and the 1994 and 1995 amendments of Rule 12-102 went the opposite
way, first on a case-by-case basis and then all at once. But the supreme court was
effectively undoing what it had done in its 1983 Order. If the court could validly
order the transfer of all contract-case appeals to itself, it217could surely also rescind
that order and put an end to the transfer of such appeals.
The incorporation of contract cases into the court of appeals' docket does not
appear to have imposed an overwhelming burden.218 Moreover, as Judges Donnelly
and Minzner anticipated, the supreme court now functions to a large extent as a true
supreme court rather than merely an error-correcting court. Its evolution toward a
court of last resort has tended to obviate debate about the extent to which the court
can assign cases to itself or the court of appeals. Simply stated, if there is only one
court of general appellate jurisdiction (as there was until 1966), there should be only
rare occasion to ask who defines that jurisdiction.
To the extent that workload pressures or other concerns still give cause to
consider redistributing the appellate workload, it may be tempting to conclude that
the statutory transfer mechanism in section 34-5-8(B) gives the supreme court
plenary authority to move cases back and forth between itself and the court of
appeals. Such a conclusion would be unfounded. Section 34-5-8(B) authorizes the
supreme court to reassign classes of cases from the court of appeals to itself.219 It
does not, however, furnish the power to alter either court's underlying jurisdiction

213. See Rule 12-102(C) NMRA (1995).
214. See Rule 12-102 NMRA (1997).
215. Rule 12-102(B) NMRA (1997).
216. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(B) (1983).
217. Granted, this rationale does not fully justify the 1994 amendment of Rule 12-102, which provided for
the transfer of cases already in the supreme court back to the court of appeals. As previously stated, section 34-58(B) authorizes transfers only from the intermediate court to the high court. Cf State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420,424,
423 P.2d 611, 614 (1967) (expressing doubt, but not deciding, whether statute authorizing transfer of appeal filed
in wrong court gave appellate courts "power to alter jurisdiction"). Any doubt about the supreme court's authority
to transfer cases pursuant to the 1994 amendment was short-lived, however, and, after the 1995 amendment, moot.
218. Recent court statistics indicate that summary calendar cases, comprising approximately two-thirds of
the court of appeals' docket, are decided in roughly seven months on average. General calendar cases, comprising
the remainder of its docket, are decided in an average of about twenty-one months. See N.M. CouRT OF APPEALS
STATS, AVERAGE DAYS (2005-2006), http://coa.nmcourts.com/statistics/averagedays20052006.pdf.

219. NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(B) (1983) (authorizing supreme court to provide for transfer of any action or
decision enumerated in section 34-5-8 from court of appeals to supreme court).
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as prescribed by the legislature or, in other words, the power to "specifically
reserve[]" jurisdiction to one court or the other, independent of statute.220
It follows that section 34-5-8(B) does not empower the court (1) to preempt a
statutory right of direct appeal to the court of appeals and replace it with a right to
request discretionary review in the supreme court,22' (2) to direct that a class of
appeals be taken to the court of appeals in the face of a statute divesting that court
of jurisdiction,22 2 or (3) to create a new right of action with an appeal to the supreme
court in the absence of statutory authority for the right of action or the right of
appeal.223 In such cases, reserving jurisdiction to one court or the other is
inconsistent not only with the transfer authority in section 34-5-8(B), but also with
the constitutional mandate that the courts' appellate jurisdiction shall be as provided
by law. We proceed to consider concrete instances in which the court has, in our
view, exceeded its constitutional authority.
C. Appeals in PostconvictionRemedy Proceedings
Immediately following the 1965 amendments of article VI, procedures governing
postconviction remedy proceedings were established by both a statute, now
compiled as section 31-11-6,224 and a rule, former Rule 93 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. 225 The rule and statute were materially identical and were put in place
side by side to avoid the question of which body, the legislature or the supreme
court, had authority to prescribe the procedures.226 They provided that an appeal
could be taken from an order on a motion for postconviction relief "in the manner
and within the time provided in" former Supreme Court Rule 5.227 Promulgated in
1935, Supreme Court Rule 5 specified the time and manner of perfecting an
appeal.228 The rule provided that an appeal from a final judgment of the district court
was to be taken to the supreme court. 229 Because the rule was promulgated long
before the creation of the court of appeals, however, this provision could not have
been intended to direct appeals to one appellate court instead of another. Rather, the
supreme court was the only court to which an appeal from the district court could
be taken.
The question of which court had jurisdiction over appeals in postconviction
proceedings arose soon after the court of appeals began its work because the first
cases that it heard were postconviction remedy proceedings. 230 When the supreme
court first addressed the jurisdictional question, it looked not to its rules, but to the
relevant statute. As enacted in 1966, section 34-5-8 did not grant the court of

220. Rule 12-102(A)(4) NMRA.
221. See infra Part IV.C.
222. See infra Part IV.D.
223. See infra Part I.E.
224. NMSA 1978, § 31-11-6(1966).
225. NMSA 1953, § 21-1-1(93) (1965) (superseded 1975).
226. Thomas A. Donnelly & William T. MacPherson, Habeas Corpus in New Mexico, 11 N.M. L REV. 291,
300 (1981).
227. NMSA 1953, § 21-1-1(93)(e) (1965); accord NMSA 1978, § 31-11-6(e) (1966).
228. NMSA 1941, § 19-201(5) (1935) (recodified as amended at NMSA 1953, § 21-2-1(5) (1959)).
229. Id.
230. Donnelly & Minzner, supra note 106, at 601.
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appeals jurisdiction over postconviction remedy proceedings as such.23' The statute
did, however, contain the provision authorizing review in criminal actions not
involving a sentence of death or life imprisonment.23 2 The question thus reduced to
whether postconviction remedy proceedings were criminal actions. The supreme
court answered that such proceedings were civil rather than criminal and that the
court of appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction.233
Even as the supreme court rendered that answer, the legislature was in the process
of amending section 34-5-8(A) to give the court of appeals jurisdiction over appeals
in "postconviction remedy proceedings except where the sentence involved is death
or life imprisonment., 23' As appeals under the new statutory provision wound their
way through the courts, the supreme court acknowledged the amendment in
dictum,235 and the court of appeals proceeded for a number of years to exercise
jurisdiction over such appeals.236
In 1975, the supreme court promulgated a new rule, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to supersede Rule 93 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.237 Rule
57 was modeled on the federal statute providing for postconviction remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2255, as Rule 93 and section 31-11-6 had been, but it differed significantly
from Rule 93 because it incorporated changes proposed for the federal statute in
1973 .238 Following the recommendations of an advisory committee to the United
States Judicial Conference, postconviction remedy proceedings under Rule 57 were
to be treated as a further step in a prisoner's criminal proceeding rather than as a
separate civil proceeding-hence the promulgation of a rule of criminal procedure
in place of a rule of civil procedure.239 More significant for present purposes, a
district court's order on a motion for a postconviction remedy was "final and not
subject to appeal" under Rule 57.m4

As late as 1980 in State v. Castillo,24' the court of appeals reaffirmed its
jurisdiction over postconviction remedy proceedings as conferred by section 34-58(A)(4). The court did so based on an expansive interpretation of "post-conviction
remedy proceedings," adding that Rule 57 did not "dictate or even indicate a
contrary conclusion."
But the vitality of the Castillodecision was short-lived. Just three years later, the
supreme court issued the 1983 Order directing that "appeals from the granting of

231.
232.
233.
234.

Act of Mar. 1, 1966, ch. 28, § 8, 1966 N.M. Laws 102, 106.
NMSA 1953, § 16-7-8(C) (1966) (recodified at NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(3) (1983)).
State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420, 423, 423 P.2d 611, 613-14 (1967).
Act of Feb. 27, 1967, ch. 24, § l(D), 1967 N.M. Laws 287,287-88 (originally codified at NMSA 1953,

§ 16-7-8(D) (1967), recodified at NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(4) (1983)).
235. State v. Garlick, 80 N.M. 352, 353, 456 P.2d 185, 186 (1969) (recognizing that 1967 amendment of
section 34-5-8 "placed jurisdiction of appeals from postconviction proceedings in [the court of appeals]").
236. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 82 N.M. 630, 631, 485 P.2d 741, 742 (Ct. App. 1971).
237. NMSA 1953, § 41-23-57 (1975) (superseded 1986).
238. Donnelly & MacPherson, supra note 226, at 300-01.
239. Caristo v. Sullivan, 112 N.M. 623, 628-29, 818 P.2d 401, 406-07 (1991) (discussing the committee

commentary to Rule 57).
240. NMSA 1953, § 41-23-57(a) (1975) (superseded 1986).
241. 94 N.M. 352, 610 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1980).

242. Id. at 354-55, 610 P.2d at 758-59.
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writs of habeas corpus" be taken to the supreme court.2 3 It may not have been
immediately apparent that this order conflicted with the court of appeals'
jurisdiction to hear appeals in postconviction remedy proceedings. One might have
concluded that proceedings on writs of habeas corpus were distinct from both (1) a
prisoner's underlying criminal trial and appeal and (2) postconviction proceedings
under Rule 57. 244 The courts' rules and decisions soon collapsed this distinction,
however, and confirmed that a prisoner had no right to a direct appeal from a denial
of either a Rule 57 motion or a writ of habeas corpus.
Thus, in 1984, the court of appeals held in State v. Garcia245 that Rule 57 had
abolished the right of appeal in postconviction proceedings.24 The court reasoned
that Rule 57 was procedural, that the supreme court had exclusive power to regulate
matters of procedure, and that the rule therefore superseded the statutory provision
for appeal in section 31-11-6.247 Curiously, the court did not mention section 34-58(A)(4), but one may suppose that if Rule 57 superseded section 31-11-6, then it
superseded section 34-5-8(A)(4) as well.
The court in Garciarelied explicitly on the inherent authority doctrine and on
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,Inc. in particular. 248 Far from supporting the
holding in Garcia,however, Ammerman reaffirmed, as beyond question, that the
legislature properly determines the extent of the courts' appellate jurisdiction.249
Thus, whether or not one begins with the premise that the supreme court has
exclusive authority over procedural matters, the subject of Garcia'sholding-the
right of appeal-cannot be deemed procedural. Rule 57 was, of course, a rule of
criminal procedure, but the circularity of reasoning on that basis alone is
apparent-the supreme court properly promulgated Rule 57 because it is a rule of
57 is a rule of procedure because the supreme court properly
procedure, and 2Rule
5°
promulgated it.
The court in Garcia also invoked the distinction in State v. Arnold25' between
substantive law, by which a right to appeal may be created, and procedural law, by
252
which restrictions may be placed on the time and manner of exercising that right.

243.

1983 Order, supra note 173.

244. The supreme court's prior decisions treated postconviction remedy proceedings and habeas corpus
proceedings as distinct-the former appealable, the latter not. See State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420,422,423 P.2d 611,
613 (1967) (observing that postconviction remedy proceeding under Rule 93 "has not been replaced or supplanted
habeas corpus which is not suspended, as indeed it could not be under Art. L Sec. 9, U.S. Const., and Art. IL Sec.
7, N.M. Const."). Compare State v. Garlick, 80 N.M. 352, 353, 456 P.2d 185, 186 (1969) (recognizing in dictum
that appeal in postconviction remedy proceedings may be taken to the court of appeals), with State v. Sisk, 79 N.M.
167, 168, 441 P.2d 207, 208 (1968) (holding that no appeal is available in habeas corpus proceedings).
245. 101 N.M. 232, 680 P.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1984).
246. Id. at 235, 680 P.2d at 616 ("The clear language of Rule 57(a) states that orders of the district court on
a motion under the rule are not appealable.").
247. Id. at 234-35, 680 P.2d at 615-16.
248. Id. at 235, 680 P.2d at 616 (citing Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354
(1976)).
249. See Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359.
250. Cf id. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357 ("The very fact of adoption of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence...,by
this court, is conclusive of its determination that at least these rules as adopted are procedural."). But see Browde
& Occhialino, supra note 78, at 466 (deeming it unwise "to bootstrap the existence of a procedure rule into
conclusive proof that the rule is procedural").
251. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947).
252. Garcia,101 N.M. at 234, 680 P.2d at 615; see Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
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The court proceeded, however, to affirm the power of the judiciary not merely to
modify a time limitation for an appeal, but to eliminate the right of appeal
altogether.25 3 If the creation of a right of appeal is substantive and outside the
supreme court's rulemaking power, it follows that the elimination of that right is
also substantive.254
Rule 57 was superseded in 1986 as part of the supreme court's comprehensive
revision of its rules .5 5 In place of Rule 57, the court promulgated Rule 5-802, a rule
of criminal procedure governing habeas corpus practice, and Rules 12-102(A)(5)
and 12-501, rules of appellate procedure governing appeals in habeas corpus
proceedings.256 Rules 5-802 and 12-102(A)(5) codified the provision in the 1983
Order giving the state a direct appeal to the supreme court from a district court order
granting a writ of habeas corpus. 57 Together with Rule 12-501, Rule 5-802 also
made explicit what might have been inferred from the 1983 Order, namely, that a
prisoner may request discretionary review of an order denying habeas relief by
petitioning the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.2 8
The replacement of Rule 57 with Rule 5-802 eliminated any distinction between
a postconviction motion under the former rule and a petition for writ of habeas
corpus 5 9 Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 5-802 was "to simplify and expedite
post-conviction proceedings" by, among other things, eliminating the potentially
redundant step of a Rule 57 motion as a precondition of habeas review. 26 Just as the
court of appeals deemed Rule 57 to abrogate the right of appeal in section 31-11262 did
6,261 however, so, in its 1990 decision in State v. Peppers,
the court conclude
that Rule 5-802 "preempted" the statutory right of appeal in section 31-11-6. The
court relied for this conclusion on "the supreme court's predominance when a
supreme court rule and a statute conflict on matters of procedure. 26 3 It declined to
consider a challenge of Rule 5-802 on constitutional and statutory grounds, citing
its duty to follow supreme court rules.26 It also added in dicta that the appellant's
statutory argument was answered by Garcia, although it did not specify whether
section 34-5-8(A)(4) was among the statutes at issue.265

253. Garcia, 101 N.M. at 234-35, 680 P.2d at 615-16 (holding that, upon adoption of Rule 57 in 1975, "the
statute was not effective to provide a post-conviction remedy to the extent it conflicted with Rule 57").
254. See Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47; see also Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 260, 149 P.2d
795, 799 (1944) (recognizing that, even when the supreme court exercises inherent rule-making power, "the court
does not assume to affect substantive rights of the parties"); cf NMSA 1978, § 38-1-1(A) (1966) (providing that
court rules governing procedure shall "not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant").
255. State v. Peppers, 110 N.M. 393, 396, 796 P.2d 614, 617 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he supreme court
superseded Rule 57 with Rule 5-802 in February 1986....").
256. Rules 5-802, 12-102(A)(5), 12-501 NMRA (1986).
257. Rules 5-802(G)(1), 12-102(A)(5) NMRA (1986).
258. Rules 5-802(G)(2), 12-501 NMRA (1986).
259. See Martinez v. State, I10 N.M. 357, 358-59, 796 P.2d 250, 251-52 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
petition styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 5-802 was a postconviction remedy proceeding).
260. Peppers, 110 N.M. at396, 796 P.2d at 617.
261. See supra notes 245-247 and accompanying text.
262. 110 N.M. 393, 796 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1990).

263. Id. at 396, 796 P.2d at 617.
264. Id. at 397-98, 796 P.2d at 618-19.
265. Id. at 398 n.2, 796 P.2d at 619 n.2.
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The decision in Peppers recognized that the habeas procedure of Rule 5-802 was
not the exclusive means of seeking postconviction relief and that other avenues
might be available for seeking specific remedies after a conviction. 2 6 These include
a motion under Rule 5-614 for new trial, a motion under Rule 5-801 to reduce a
sentence, and perhaps a motion under section 39-1-1 for relief from a judgment.267
The court of appeals continues to hear appeals of some rulings on such motions,
apparently on the basis that they are preliminary to, and merged into, the final
judgment in268a criminal case and thus within the court' sjurisdiction under section 345-8(A)(3).

In the wake of Peppers, however, it is firmly entrenched that Rule 5-802
prescribes the method of seeking review in most postconviction proceedings. The
alternative postconviction motions identified by the court in Peppers serve limited
purposes and can be brought only within relatively short periods after a criminal
conviction.269 The habeas petition, in contrast, has become the one-size-fits-all procedural device for litigating a wide array of claims challenging "the constitutionality
or legality of a confinement or detention" or other custodial deprivation.27 This
Article does not question the propriety of applying the "Great Writ" flexibly to a
broad range of claims.27 ' But the presumed efficacy of the habeas remedy does not
justify the preemption by rule of a prisoner's right to a direct appeal, and the court
of appeals' jurisdiction to hear the appeal, in the full range of postconviction
proceedings.272
Rule 5-802 was amended in 2002 and now provides for separate sets of
procedures in death penalty and non-death penalty cases.273 The rule provides for an
automatic right to appeal to the supreme court by any aggrieved party in a death
penalty case.274 In non-death penalty cases, by contrast, Rule 5-802 retains the

266. Id.at 395-97, 796 P.2d at 616-18.
876 P.2d 222, 223 n.1 (1994) (questioning whether
267. Id. But cf State v. Neely, 117 N.M. 707, 708 n.l,
section 39-1-1 applies in cases other than civil bench trials).
268. See State v. House, 2001-NMCA-01 1, 1 11, 25 P.3d 257, 261 (asserting jurisdiction to review denial of
motion for relief from sentence); State v. Armijo, 1997-NMCA-080, 124, 944 P.2d 919, 926 (reviewing denial of
motion for new trial); cf. State v. Griffin, 117 N.M. 745, 750, 877 P.2d 551, 556 (1994) (implying that order
granting new trial is not appealable except when it presents question of law).
269. See State v. Lucero, 2001-NMSC-024, 1 10, 30 P.3d 365, 367 (holding that district court lacks
jurisdiction to grant motion under Rule 5-614(C) filed more than ten days after verdict); id. 7, 30 P.3d at 366
(observing that district court lacks jurisdiction to grant motion under Rule 5-801 filed more than ninety days after
sentence).
270. See, e.g., Cordova v. LeMaster, 2004-NMSC-026, 1 1, 96 P.3d 778, 779-80 (determining the
constitutionality of the indefinite termination of an inmate's spousal visitation); Lopez v. LeMaster, 2003-NMSC003, 71J1, 10, 61 P.3d 185, 186, 189 (noting that a writ of habeas corpus might be characterized as a remedy for a
violation of an inmate's due process rights).
271. See Lopez, 2003-NMSC-003, 12, 61 P.3d at 189 (noting trend toward expanded applicability of writ).
272. We say "presumed" efficacy because it is not clear that a petition for writ of habeas corpus affords the
speedy process that it once did. See, e.g., Cordova, 2004-NMSC-026, 1 7, 96 P.3d at 781 ("The resolution of the
issues raised on appeal has been delayed an unusually long time."). In 1941, the supreme court deemed a habeas
proceeding "much more efficacious" than an appeal, reasoning that "the delays incident to an appeal" are bypassed
when a prisoner files an original habeas petition in the supreme court. In re Forest, 45 N.M. 204, 208, 113 P.2d 582,
584 (1941). Rule 5-802 has imported the full appellate process into habeas proceedings, however, even as it has
downgraded a prisoner's appeal from mandatory to discretionary. See Rule 5-802(H)(2) NMRA.
273. See Rule 5-802(F) NMRA (governing procedure in death penalty cases); Rule 5-802(E), (H) NMRA
(governing procedure in non-death penalty cases).
274. Rule 5-802(F)(6) NMRA (providing in death penalty cases that, "if the writ is granted, the state may
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disparate provisions for an automatic right to an appeal when the state seeks review
of an order granting habeas relief, but only a discretionary appeal when a prisoner
seeks review of an order denying relief.275
We emphasize that the appeal provided by Rule 5-802 is not an appeal under
section 34-5-8(A)(4) by a different name. The supreme court's very power to issue
writs of habeas corpus is not statutory at all, but constitutional. It is part of the
supreme court's original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 and is concurrent
with the district courts' original jurisdiction under article VI, section 13.276 Before
the adoption of Rule 5-802, the supreme court effectively reviewed district court
denials of relief in habeas proceedings by entertaining petitions for writ of habeas
corpus in most cases only after the petitioner had unsuccessfully sought relief in the
district court. 277 Nonetheless, the supreme court long held that there was no right of
appeal in habeas corpus proceedings (as distinguished from statutory postconviction
remedy proceedings) because the legislature had not granted such a right. 278 Thus,
Rule 5-802 notwithstanding, the supreme court's jurisdiction in habeas proceedings
is original.
In contrast, the court of appeals' jurisdiction in postconviction remedy
proceedings is strictly statutory since the intermediate court has no original
jurisdiction.2 7 9 Rule 5-802 conflicts with the constitutional regime both by asserting
an appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court in habeas corpus proceedings and by
supplanting the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals in postconviction
remedy proceedings.280
Nor can Rule 5-802 be understood as an exercise of the supreme court's authority
under section 34-5-8(B) to transfer appeals in postconviction remedy proceedings
from the court of appeals to itself. Because review under section 34-5-8(A)(4) is
mandatory, it is exclusive of the supreme court's exercise of a power under Rule 5802 to decline to hear an appeal by denying a petition for certiorari. An appeal under
Rule 5-802, which in some cases is mandatory and in other cases discretionary, is
fundamentally inconsistent with an appeal under section 34-5-8(A)(4), which in all
cases is mandatory.2"'

appeal," and "if the writ is denied, the petitioner may appeal").
275. Rule 5-802(H) NMRA (providing in non-death penalty cases that "if the writ is granted, the state may
appeal as of right pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure," and "if the writ is denied, a petition for certiorari

may be filed with the Supreme Court").
276. N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 13; see Exparte Nabors, 33 N.M. 324, 326, 267 P. 58, 59 (1928).
277. Donnelly & MacPherson, supra note 226, at 310.

278. See California v. Clements, 83 N.M. 764, 764, 497 P.2d 975, 975 (1972) ("[P]etitioner has no right of
appeal to this court from the denial by the district court of his petition for writ of habeas corpus."); State v. Sisk,
79 N.M. 167, 168, 441 P.2d 207, 208 (1968) ("[N]o appeal is available in habeas corpus proceedings."); Notestine
v. Rogers, 18 N.M. 462, 467, 138 P. 207, 208 (1914) (holding that courts will not recognize right of appeal in
habeas corpus cases until legislature provides for such right "in clear and unequivocal language, and under suitable
regulations which do not impair the constitutional provisions governing the right to the writ"); see also supra note

244.
279. N.M. CoNST. art. VL § 29; see State ex rel. Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71, 73, 428 P.2d
473, 475 (1967).
280. Rule 5-802(F)(6), (H) NMRA; see State v. Peppers, 110 N.M. 393, 396, 796 P.2d 614, 617 (Ct. App.
1990) (holding that Rule 5-802 "pre-empted" the right of appeal in postconviction remedy proceedings as provided
by statute).
281. Compare Rule 5-802(F)(6), (H) NMRA, with NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8(A)(4) (1983).
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In summary, the appellate jurisdiction currently asserted by the supreme court in
postconviction remedy proceedings is contrary to article VI, section 2 because it is
as provided by rule rather than statute. Section 34-5-8(A)(4) confers jurisdiction on
the court of appeals in all postconviction remedy proceedings. In contrast, the
supreme court's rules assert jurisdiction in the supreme court itself to hear
mandatory appeals by either party in death penalty cases, and mandatory appeals by
the state but only discretionary appeals by prisoners in non-death penalty cases.
D. The Writ of Error in the Court of Appeals
The writ of error was once the procedural vehicle for judicial review of
proceedings at law, while an appeal was the vehicle for review of proceedings in
equity. 282 After the merger of law and equity, and by the time of the 1992 decision

in Carrillov. Rostro 3 the writ of error procedure had "fallen into almost complete
disuse" and was "largely a dead letter. ,28 In Carrillo,however, the supreme court
announced that it was adapting the writ of error to a new role, that of implementing
in New Mexico the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan
Corp.285 The court intended that the writ of error would permit immediate review in

exceptional cases in which the remedy by way of appeal after final judgment was
inadequate and an interlocutory appeal under the existing statutory authority was
unavailable.286
Carrillomade clear that the supreme court would issue writs of error, but whether
it contemplated that the court of appeals might also do so is unclear: "[Tihe
aggrieved party will have to apply to this Court for a writ of error, which will be
issued or not in our discretion."2 7 The decision noted that, in designating the writ
of error as the appropriate procedural device to be employed in these circumstances,
the court was exercising its constitutional power of superintending control. 288 Absent
a constitutional limitation, the court presumably could invoke its superintending

282. Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607,617,845 P.2d 130, 140 (1992). The supreme court sketched the history
of the writ of error in New Mexico in an appendix to the Carrillodecision. Id at 623-24, 845 P.2d at 146-47.
283. 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130.
284. Id. at 617-18, 845 P.2d at 140-41.
285. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 617-18 & n.9, 845 P.2d at 140-41 & n.9. The court in
Carrillo quoted a recent articulation of the collateral order doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:
"The collateral order doctrine is a 'narrow exception,' whose reach is limited to trial court orders
affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal. To fall

within the exception, an order must at a minimum satisfy three conditions: It must 'conclusively
determine the disputed question,' 'resolve an important issue completely separate from the

merits of the action,' and 'be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."'
Id. at 613, 845 P.2d at 136 (quoting Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (other citation

omitted)).
286. See Carrllo,114 N.M. at 617-19, 845 P.2d at 140-42; cf NMSA 1978, §§ 39-3-2 (1966) (conferring
jurisdiction over appeal in civil case from "any final judgment or decision"), 39-3-4 (2) (1999) (conferring
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal when district court certifies that order or decision involves controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that immediate appeal may materially
advance ultimate termination of litigation).
287.

Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 617, 845 P.2d at 140 (emphasis added); see also Rule 12-503 NMRA (1992)

("Writs of error will be issued by the supreme court only upon a showing that the remedy by way of appeal is
inadequate." (emphasis added)), quoted in Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 617, 845 P.2d at 140.
288. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 618, 845 P.2d at 141 (citing Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 43 N.M. 234,
237, 89 P.2d 615, 616 (1939)).
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power to amend Rule 12-503 and to authorize the court of appeals to issue writs of
error in cases within its jurisdiction. The supreme court appears to have intended
that result when, one year after Carrillo,it rewrote Rule 12-503. As amended in
1993, the rule provides that the court of appeals, as well as the supreme court, can
issue writs of error. Rule 12-503(B), entitled "Jurisdiction to issue," reads as
follows: "As part of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 29 of the
Constitution of New Mexico, the Court of Appeals is granted authority to issue writs
of error in those
cases over which it would have appellate jurisdiction from a final
289
judgment.,

This "grant" of authority to the court of appeals is difficult to reconcile, however,
with either the court of appeals' jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 29, or the
supreme court's power to make rules authorizing the court of appeals to issue writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction. The court of appeals' jurisdiction
is as may be provided by law. 290 As the court in Carrillo recognized, a statute,
section 39-3-5, grants authority to issue writs of error to the supreme court, but it
limits that authority to cases in which the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction:
"Writs of error to bring into the supreme court any cause adjudged or determined
in any of the district courts, as provided by law, may be issued by the supreme
court, or anyjustice thereof,if application is made within the time provided by
law for the taking of appeals. A writ of error shall issue from the supreme court
to the district court only in those actions wherein appellatejurisdictionhas not
been vested by law in the court of appeals."29'

Section 39-3-5 is not the only source of the supreme court's power to issue writs
of error. As the court in Carrilloalso recognized, the constitution confers that power
on the supreme court as part of its originaljurisdiction.29 2 As previously noted,293
however, the court of appeals has no original jurisdiction and cannot issue writs
available to the supreme court except insofar as it is authorized to do so by rule in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.2 9 The constitutional question reduces, then, to
whether the supreme court, through Rule 12-503, could authorize the court of
appeals to issue writs of error as necessary or appropriate "in aid of' the
intermediate court's appellate jurisdiction.2 95
We must conclude that the supreme court could not do so because authority to
issue writs in aid of jurisdiction cannot be granted where no underlying jurisdiction
is provided by law. No statute grants the court of appeals jurisdiction in the
instances before final judgment when it issues writs of error. To the contrary, the
only circumstances in which writs of error are authorized by statute are precisely
those under section 39-3-5 in which the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction.296 Rule

289.

Rule 12-503(B) NMRA.

290. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
291.

Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 617, 845 P.2d at 140 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 39-3-5 (1966) (emphasis added)).

292. Id. at 616, 845 P.2d at 139 (citing N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3).
293. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
294. N.M. CONST.art. VI, § 29; see State ex rel. Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71,73-74,428 P.2d
473, 475-76 (1967).

295. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
296. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-5 (1966) (authorizing supreme court to issue writs of error "only in those
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12-503 itself purports to grant the court of appeals authority to issue writs of error
when it would not otherwise have jurisdiction inasmuch as that authority is to be
exercised only when the court of appeals "would have" jurisdiction after a final

judgment. 297 It follows that, but for Rule 12-503, the court of appeals would lack

jurisdiction for want of a final judgment. 298 Under both section 39-3-5 and Rule 12503 itself, then, the court of appeals' authority to issue writs of error is not in aid,
but in absence, of its appellate jurisdiction.
There are sensible reasons for the supreme court to have sought, through Rule 12503, to authorize the court of appeals to issue writs of error. As the rule anticipates,
the court of appeals would have jurisdiction, after final judgment, in at least some
of the cases in which immediate review is sought. Indeed, New Mexico courts have
thus far recognized only two types of orders reviewable by writ of error: (1) denials
of claims of sovereign immunity in breach-of-contract actions and (2) denials of
claims of qualified immunity in civil rights actions. 299 Appeals from final judgments
in both contract and civil rights actions are within the court of appeals' jurisdiction
over civil actions generally.3 It is logical from the standpoint of judicial economy
that the court of appeals should hear an appeal before judgment in a case in which
it may hear another appeal afterjudgment. It may have been just such considerations
that led the supreme court to "grant" jurisdiction to the court of appeals to conduct
immediate review by writ of error.
Be that as it may, expedience and wisdom cannot save Rule 12-503 from
constitutional infirmity any more than mere silliness would condemn it. 3° ' The
revival of writ of error procedure in Carrilloapparently began with the assumption
that the supreme court itself would exercise that power. The court of appeals'
jurisdiction as provided by law is not compatible with the intermediate court's use
of the writ of error.
E. Judicial Election Contests
Until recently, the New Mexico Code of Judicial Conduct, like similar rules in
other states, restricted candidates for election to judicial office in what they could
say in the electoral process. A candidate was prohibited to "make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court" or to "announce how the candidate
would rule on any case or issue that may come before the court." 3°2 In the 2002

actions wherein appellate jurisdiction has not been vested by law in the court of appeals").
297. Rule 12-503(B) NMRA.
298. See id.; see also Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 612-13, 845 P.2d at 135-36 ("It is of course firmly established
that, subject to certain exceptions, this Court has no jurisdiction to review an order or decision that is not final....");
State v. Apodaca, 1997-NMCA-051,
11, 940 P.2d 478, 481 ("[Olur Supreme Court has not adopted the view of
the United States Supreme Court that an order satisfying the collateral order doctrine is a 'final decision."').
299. King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-031,
16, 86 P.3d 631,634.
300. NMSA 1978, §§ 34-5-8(A)(1) (1983), 39-3-2 (1966).
301. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562,570,904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995) ("Although it is not within
the province of this Court to evaluate the wisdom of an act of either the legislature or the Governor, it certainly is
our role to determine whether that act goes beyond the bounds established by our state Constitution.").
302. Rule 21-700(B)(4)(b)-(c) NMRA (2003).
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decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,303 the U.S. Supreme Court

announced that a similar prohibition in Minnesota violated the First Amendment
right of free speech.3" After the decision in White, New Mexicans undoubtedly were
concerned that, without some restraints on the political activity of candidates for
judicial office, election campaigns could so degenerate as to undermine public
confidence in the judiciary.
The result in New Mexico was to repeal the restrictions on candidate speech
quoted above but to retain other restrictions not directly addressed in White and to
establish new means of enforcing them. Among the remaining restrictions are
requirements that candidates for election to judicial office maintain the dignity
appropriate to judicial office, 5 refrain from making promises inconsistent with the
impartial performance of adjudicative duties, 3°6 and refrain from campaign fundraising activities having the appearance of impropriety. 3 To enforce these and other
standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct, the supreme court recently amended the
Code to create a private right of action. 3' Rule 21-900(C) provides that a judicial
election candidate may bring an action to challenge an opponent's violation of Rule
21-700 or Rule 21-800, relating to political and campaign fund-raising activities.
The new rule prescribes detailed procedures for such actions. 309 In addition, the rule
creates a right of direct appeal to the supreme court: "Appeals shall be taken directly
to the Supreme Court of New Mexico pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12-603
NMRA of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 31
Rule 12-603, to which Rule 21-900(C) refers, "governs appeals taken pursuant
to NMSA 1978, §§ 1-8-18 and 1-8-35. ''3 1 Sections 1-8-18 and 1-8-35, in turn, grant
a right of appeal to the supreme court in an action by a voter challenging the
qualifications of a candidate for nomination by a political party or for primary
election. 312 Section 1-8-18, which creates the underlying right of action, specifies the
two grounds on which the candidate's qualifications may be challenged, namely,
party affiliation and place of residence. 3 3 Rule 12-603 poses no apparent conflict
with sections 1-8-18 and 1-8-35 as the rule does not purport to alter the supreme
court's jurisdiction to hear the appeals that the statutes authorize, and indeed, the
procedural details that it establishes appear consistent with those provided in section
1-8-35. 3 14

303. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
304. Id. at 788.

305. Rule 21-700(B)(1) NMRA.
306. Rule 21-700(B)(4)(a) NMRA.
307. Rule 21-800 NMRA.
308. N.M. Sup. Ct. Order, No. 04-8300 (Sept. 21, 2004).
309. See, e.g., Rule 21-900(C)(1) NMRA (specifying filing, service, and venue requirements); Rule 21900(C)(3) NMRA (specifying procedure for hearing); Rule 21-900(C)(5) NMRA (specifying procedure for
discovery).
310. Rule 21-900(C)(6) NMRA.
311. Rule 12-603(A) NMRA.
312. NMSA 1978, § 1-8-18(B) (1981); id. § 1-8-35(A) (1993).
313. Id. § 1-8-18(A)(1)-(2).
314. Compare id. § 1-8-35(A) (specifying that appeal shall be to supreme court and notice of appeal shall be
filed within five days after district court's decision), with Rule 12-603(B)-(C) NMRA (specifying the same).
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Rule 21-900(C), by contrast, is not sanctioned by section 1-8-18, section 1-8-35,
or any other statutory authority. The right of action that the rule establishes is
independent of that authorized by section 1-8-18. A judicial candidate's challenge
of an opponent's failure to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, for
example, need not have anything to do with the opponent' s party affiliation or place
of residence. Whereas Rule 12-603 addresses the procedure to be followed in
appeals taken "pursuant to" specific statutes, Rule 21-900(C) cites no statute
pursuant to which an appeal is to be taken. Rule 21-900(C) thus does not merely
specify the procedure for appeal, but creates the right of appeal itself and, by
implication, the supreme court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal. That is precisely
what State v. Arnold says the court is "powerless" to do because creating a right of
appeal is a matter of substantive law beyond the court's rule-making power. 5
One might argue that the supreme court's inherent authority and supervisory
control over the lower courts empower it to create a right of action and to grant a
right of appeal when necessary to the enforcement and vindication of its rules of
professional and judicial conduct. 31 6 But this view of Rule 21-900(C) cannot be
squared with the inherent authority doctrine on its own terms. The rule's designation
within the Code of Judicial Conduct does not in and of itself legitimize it.317 On its
face, the rule is not limited to regulating the practice of law or the conduct of
attorneys or judges in judicial proceedings. The remedies that it authorizes-"any
remedial decrees for cessation of violations, retractions, corrective publications or
other relief as may be reasonably required to rectify the effects of the
violation"-are explicitly cumulative of the courts' authority to refer alleged
violations to the Judicial Standards Commission or the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court for enforcement. 8 The power to enforce standards of judicial
conduct is delegated in the first instance to the district courts, which possess neither
the supreme court's authority over disciplinary proceedings nor its power of
superintending control over the entire court system.3 '9 The conduct at which the rule
is directed, moreover, occurs almost of necessity outside judicial proceedings, in
election campaigns and political discourse by which candidates seek to become or
remain judges.
Election campaigns are an area in which the supreme court has in the past been
especially reluctant to invoke its rule-making power in conflict with the legislature's
actions. In Eturriagav. Valdez, 320 the court held that a thirty-day period prescribed
by statute for initiating an election contest prevailed over a fifteen-day time

315. State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311,314, 183 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1947).
316. See United States v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 423,423,684 P.2d 509,509 (1984) (affirming supreme court's
"exclusive right to regulate the practice of law" in relation to canon of judicial conduct prohibiting judges from
practicing law); Browde & Occhialino, supra note 78, at 452-55; cf. Ortiz v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998NMCA-027, 1 1, 954 P.2d 109, 110-11 (holding that "revolving door" statute prohibiting former government
attorneys from practicing law before agency that formerly employed them does not infringe on judiciary's exclusive
province to regulate practice of law).
317. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
318. Rule 21-900(C)(4) NMRA.
319. Id. Compare N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (granting supreme court superintending control over all inferior
courts), with art. VI, § 13 (granting district courts superintending control over courts and tribunals inferior to district

courts).
320. 109 N.M. 205, 784 P.2d 24 (1989).
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limitation established in Rule 1-087(B) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.3 2' The court
construed the thirty-day period as "a limitation on the substantive right the
legislature has created as well as on the remedy afforded any particular aggrieved
party," and it explained that election contests traditionally have been viewed as
"special proceedings" in which legislative rules are "binding on the district court as
well as the parties. 322 Whereas the court in Arnold held that regulations affecting
the time of taking an appeal are a proper subject of court rules, the decision in
Eturriagaclarifies that, where election contests are concerned, even the seemingly
procedural detail of the time in which to commence an action is for the legislature
to decide.323
Perhaps the result in Eturriaga merely demonstrates the elusiveness of the
substance-procedure distinction on which the decision rests. Courts and
commentators have remarked that the distinction frequently is invoked to announce
an outcome rather than to justify it.324 The discipline of identifying and evaluating
pertinent considerations of public policy is a vital part of judicial decision making
and should not be short-circuited by wooden application of judicial constructs such
as the substance-procedure dichotomy. Still, the distinction persists, and its sheer
durability suggests a continuing utility as shorthand for the underlying interests at
stake. 325 Thus, Eturriaga'sclassification of a time limitation as substantive may
denote an implicit, policy-based determination that the legislature should be given
wide berth in its regulation of election contests.326 Agreeing with that premise, we
conclude that a court rule such as Rule 21-900(C) extends too far into the
legislature's domain when it establishes a right to bring an action challenging
election conduct and a right to appeal from an adverse decision in such a case.
V. THE JUDICIARY'S PLACE IN A GOVERNMENT OF SEPARATE POWERS
The issue of whether the legislature or the judiciary should have the power to
regulate the courts' appellate jurisdiction ultimately reduces to a debate over the
proper balance of powers as between the two branches. We believe that there is a
structural reason for concluding that the framers of article VI struck the right
balance. That reason lies in the core functions of the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary. In the simplest terms, "'[t]he Legislature makes, the executive

321. ld. at 209-10, 784 P.2d at 28-29.
322. Id. at 210, 784 P.2d at 29.
323. Id.; cf. State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 314, 183 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1947).
324. In re Estate of Gilmore, 1997-NMCA-103, 11, 946 P.2d 1130, 1133-34 ("'Except at the extremes, the
terms "substance" and "procedure" precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a
particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn."') (quoting Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)); see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392-93 (1989) (warning of
the "logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules"); Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34,
39-41,791 P.2d 788,793-95 (1990) (Montgomery, J., dissenting); Browde & Occhialino, supra note 78, at 444-46
& n.227.
13, 946 P.2d at 1134 (recognizing continuing need to distinguish
325. See Gilmore, 1997-NMCA-103,
between substance and procedure in some situations). For recent decisions relying on the substance-procedure
distinction, see, for example, UnitedStates v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755 (2005) and In re DanielH., 2003-NMCA063, IN 17-18, 68 P.3d 176, 180.
326. See Eturriaga,109 N.M. at 210, 784 P.2d at 29.
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executes, and the judiciary construes the laws.', 327 Although these functions
inevitably overlap, the basic powers of each branch "are nonetheless 'functionally
identifiable' one from another., 328 The "very essence of judicial duty," in the
archetypal enunciation of Marbury v. Madison,329 is "to say what the law is."' 330 The
province to say what the law is, has ever since been understood to entail the power
to review acts of the legislature and the executive-that is, to declare that such acts
are not "the law" when they are found to conflict with the fundamental law. 331 To
review and invalidate an act of a co-equal government branch is surely among the
most far-reaching of judicial powers. It also poses a subtle but significant risk when
it is exercised. When a court strikes down an act of the legislature or the executive,
it frustrates the popular will. The courts' legitimacy is vulnerable to attack when
their actions impede the efforts of the government's political branches.
Concomitant with the courts' power of review, then, is the importance of restraint
if the courts are to succeed in maintaining a sound balance of powers. In this regard
too, Marbury stands as the seminal authority. "[I]t is apparent," Chief Justice
Marshall wrote, "that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument,
as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.... [C]ourts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. '332 The judiciary is the final
arbiter, however, of whether any branch of government, including itself, is acting
constitutionally. For that very reason it should not be free to expand its own power
at will. That is the essential problem with empowering the courts to prescribe their
own jurisdiction. To invoke Marbury once again, prescribing limits on the
legislature's actions while "declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure"
'
would give "to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence."3 33
A comparable
risk is presented when the judiciary announces limits on its own authority but
reserves to itself the option to pass those limits at its pleasure.
It may be too much to say that the judiciary, "the least dangerous" branch, 334 will
become omnipotent if it is permitted to write its own work assignments.
Nonetheless, judges, like other humans, surely are susceptible to the "hydraulic
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of
its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives. 335 We have sought to identify
instances, few though they are, in which the New Mexico Supreme Court has
asserted authority that the constitution reserves to the legislature. The issue is not
merely that the court has trespassed into the "substantive" realm in such instances,

327. State exrel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 21, 961 P.2d 768,774 (quoting State v. Fifth Judicial
Dist. Court, 36 N.M. 151, 153, 9 P.2d 691, 692 (1932)).
328. State ex rel.
Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 573, 904 P.2d 11, 22 (1995) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983)); see Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015, 23, 961 P.2d at 775.
329. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
330. Id. at 177-78.
331. In re Extradition of Martinez, 2001-NMSC-009, 17, 20 P.3d 126, 132; State ex rel. Village of Los
Ranchos de Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 150, 156, 889 P.2d 185, 191 (1994); Territory v. Ortiz,
1 N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 5, 12-13 (1852).
332. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80.
333. Id. at 178.
334. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
335. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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although that is how New Mexico law commonly puts it.336 The more fundamental
problem is that empowering the courts to decide the extent of their own power
threatens to disrupt the judiciary's relationship with co-equal branches of
government. A power of self-appointment threatens to accrue too much power to a
single branch. It gives the judiciary a roving commission to decide what it sees fit
to hear and to reserve to itself the last word on what it decides. It poses the
countervailing risk, as well, of provoking an opposite reaction in the political realm,
a retaliatory act by another branch of government or an undermining of public
confidence in the courts.
The drafters of the Model Judicial Article argued that a power in the supreme
court to prescribe the courts' jurisdiction would enhance the judiciary's
independence.33 7 That is a truism--enhanced independence is a euphemism for
greater power. But to shift a power traditionally exercised by the legislature to the
judiciary is to alter the balance of powers, and proponents of such a shift bear the
burden of demonstrating an imbalance. Unless the respective powers of the several
branches have until now been in disequilibrium-unless the legislature has been
wielding excessive power over the courts for more than 200 years-an enhancement
of the judiciary's independence risks disrupting the existing balance.
Advocates of greater judicial power have also sometimes invoked the principle
of separation of powers. In State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride338 and Ammerman v.
HubbardBroadcasting,Inc. , the supreme court relied in part on the New Mexico
Constitution's separation-of-powers mandate as the source of an inherent and
exclusive power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. 34° Justice Carmody
likewise cited the separation-of-powers principle in urging that the 1965
amendments should follow the Model Judicial Article and empower the judiciary
to define its own jurisdiction." 41
These authorities read too much into the separation-of-powers principle. The
constitutional mandate of separate powers does not assign particular powers to any
government branch but merely prohibits each branch from assuming powers
"properly belonging" to another.342 To determine whether the power to regulate the
courts' appellate jurisdiction properly belongs to the legislature or the judiciary, one
must look to other constitutional provisions, such as sections 2 and 29 of article VI.
In this sense the operation of the separation-of-powers mandate is purely negative.
It serves to limit the exercise of powers that the constitution elsewhere affirmatively
grants. The supreme court has sometimes said that "'state constitutions are not
grants of power to the legislative, to the executive and to the judiciary, but are

336. See, e.g., Eturriaga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205,210,784 P.2d 24,29 (1989); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311,
314, 183 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1947); In re Daniel H., 2003-NMCA-063, 1 17, 68 P.3d 176, 180.
337. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
338. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
339. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
340. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. See generally Browde & Occhialino, supra note 78, at
407-11 (discussing central role of separation-of-powers principle in cases espousing inherent authority doctrine).
341. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
342. N.M. CONST.art. 11,§ 1; see Inre Extradition of Martinez, 2001-NMSC-009,1 17, 20 P.3d 126, 132;
State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 1 20, 961 P.2d 768, 774.
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limitations on the powers of each.' 343 While that is an overstatement-some
sections of the constitution plainly do grant power affirmatively-it aptly describes
the separation-of-powers mandate.
When a court relies on the separation-of-powers principle to justify its exercise
of a given power, it has already reached the conclusion, whether explicitly or not,
that the power in question properly belongs to it. The question remains whether the
court is correct in claiming that power. Under existing law, the validity of judicial
acts, like that of legislative or executive acts, ultimately is to be measured "'solely
by the yardstick of the constitution. "3"The power to prescribe the courts' appellate
jurisdiction, in particular, belongs to the legislature and not the courts because the
constitution says so explicitly. 345 Thus, what has sometimes been perceived as
legislative encroachment on the judiciary's domain is more accurately a function of
the constitutional plan. If the judiciary's power of review is a legitimate check on
legislative and executive power, the legislature's power to regulate the courts'
jurisdiction is a legitimate check on judicial power.34
There is, as we have noted, a more specific and explicit delegation to the supreme
court of authority over the judiciary, namely the power of superintending control in
article VI, section 3. Superintending control has never been thought of as a basis on
which the courts might alter their own jurisdiction, however, as the decision in
Ammerman makes clear. 47 Rather, the power is limited by its terms to control over
"inferior courts," 348 meaning the lower courts enumerated in article VI. 349 The
supreme court has from time to time invoked its superintending control to perform
the adjudicatory function of affording review of a lower court's action under
unusual circumstances in which an appeal is deemed inadequate. 350 The court can
also put its superintending control to administrative purposes, such as designating
a procedure for obtaining review.35' The focus in all events, however, is the
judiciary's internal operations rather than its external relations with other branches
of government. To regulate the conduct of the lower courts and the litigants who
come before them is a superintending function. To alter the supreme court's own
power, and thus the judiciary's position in relation to other government branches,
is not.
Finally, there is the possibility that the judiciary should have the power to define
its own jurisdiction because such power is necessary to the courts' essential role and

343. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 570, 904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995) (quoting State ex rel. Hovey
Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 252, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1957), overruled on other grounds by
Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381 (1986)).
344. Id (quoting Hovey Concrete Prods., 63 N.M. at 252, 316 P.2d at 1070).
345. See N.M. CONST. art VI, §§ 2, 29.
17, 68 P.3d 176, 180 ("[T]he separation of powers
346. See, e.g., In re Daniel H., 2003-NMCA-063,
doctrine precludes the legislature from stepping into the judiciary's exclusive domain of prescribing the rules of
judicial practice and procedure and similarly precludes the judiciary from overturning or contradicting a
constitutional legislative declaration of substantive law.").
347. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
348. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
349. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 43 N.M. 503, 510, 95 P.2d 676, 680
(1939); Carrillo v. Compusys, Inc., 1997-NMCA-003, 8, 930 P.2d 1172, 1174.
350. See In re Extradition of Martinez, 2001-NMSC-009, 12, 20 P.3d 126, 131.
351. See Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 618, 845 P.2d 130, 141 (1992).
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functioning-because, in short, it is inherently judicial. Recent New Mexico
decisions continue to posit inherent powers in the courts, powers that the supreme
court deems within its province to define precisely because they are inherently
judicial.35 2 The conception of inherent power in these decisions is notably more
restrained than the inherent authority of earlier decisions such as Ammerman and
McBride.353 Thus, the court has described inherent powers as those "'powers which
cannot be dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others,"' 354 and it has explained that a court's use of inherent powers is justified
when necessary to protect "the court's ability to perform its essential judicial
'
functions."355
In the federal sphere, debate continues over the similar question of
whether Congress's power under Article Ut of the U.S. Constitution to make
exceptions and regulations governing the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction is limited by the Court's essential role. 6
We have no quarrel with the premise that a court possesses inherent powers to be
deployed "to protect itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer
its judicial functions." ' ' It is also clear that the legislature's power to regulate the
courts' jurisdiction is not unlimited. If the legislature simply abolished appellate
jurisdiction altogether, for example, it would not be "providing by law" for the
courts' jurisdiction in any meaningful sense. More than that, the legislature would
infringe the constitutional guarantee of "an absolute right to one appeal 3 58 if it
withdrew or failed to extend any appellate recourse to an aggrieved party.
But neither the courts' inherent power to perform their essential functions, nor
any limitation on the legislature's power to regulate their jurisdiction, suggests that
the courts will be left defenseless if they do not possess the power to prescribe their
own jurisdiction. The courts are protected in other ways, both political and legal,
from meddling by other government branches. The first line of defense is the
popular will. Historically, attempts by the legislative and executive branches to
interfere with the courts' functioning have almost always failed for the simple
reason that they have been unpopular.359 If that defense fails, the courts' wellaccepted protection against unconstitutional attempts to undermine their authority

352. See, e.g., N.M. Right to Choose/NARALv. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028,71 26-30,986 P.2d 450,458-59;
State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 7, 896 P.2d 1148, 1154 (1995).
353. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL, 1999-NMSC-028, 27, 986 P.2d at 458 (stating that courts should
invoke their inherent powers "'sparingly and with circumspection"' (quoting Baca, 120 N.M. at 8, 896 P.2d at
1155)).
354. Baca, 120 N.M. at 4, 896 P.2d at 1151 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812)).
355. N.M. Right to ChooseINARAL, 1999-NMSC-028, 27, 986 P.2d at 458.
356. See generally Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984).
357. State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (1957); accord Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) at 34; Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807).
358. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
359. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 120-33, 267-73 (rev. ed. 2001) (describing
public outcry over court-packing plan and other attacks on the U. S. Supreme Court); Elliott, supra note 117, at
604-08 (recounting failure of attacks on U.S. Supreme Court, including President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
court-packing plan); Gunther, supra note 356, at 896-97 (noting that attempts to curb the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisdiction have recurred throughout the Court's history but, with one exception during the Reconstruction era,
have always failed).
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is the power of review." ° The courts' essential role remains one of review, however,
not of prescription.3 6' To enlist a power to prescribe jurisdiction would be to
abandon the essential role of the judiciary in the name of preserving it.
Consistent with this conclusion, the supreme court's recent pronouncements
emphasize that inherent judicial powers should not extend to broad public policy
determinations outside the confines of case-by-case judicial decision making.362
Public policy choices are first and foremost the mission of the legislature, second,
that of the executive, and for the judiciary "only when the body politic has not
spoken and only with the understanding that any misperception of the public mind
may be corrected shortly by the legislature. 363 In the familiar shorthand, the courts
should not make substantive law. 3" The most compelling reason that the courts
should avoid that thicket, however, is not the moniker "substance." It is instead that
the notion of inherent judicial power fails to furnish principled grounds for decision
making by the government's least politically accountable branch. 365 By asserting the
power to define its own appellate jurisdiction, the supreme court assumes the role
of primary policy maker, deciding which classes of appeals are worthy of review
and which are not. Such policy choices are constitutionally unreviewable and in
large part politically unaccountable. It is that combination that the framers of article
VI avoided, properly in our view, when they kept the power to provide for the
courts' appellate jurisdiction in the legislature.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the supreme court's rules depart in a few scattered
but significant instances from the constitutional and statutory provisions governing
the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court and the court of appeals. If one
accepts that argument, it remains to be determined how the conflict should be
resolved. The single most important step toward a resolution is recognition of the
conflict. Upon a clarification of the respective constitutional responsibilities of the
legislature and the supreme court in providing for and implementing the courts'
jurisdiction, existing incongruities between statutes and rules can readily be
eliminated and future ones can be avoided.
Such incongruities could perhaps be disposed of in one fell swoop if the
legislature simply ceded to the courts the power to provide for their jurisdiction
under article VI. The legislature could simply provide by statute that the courts'
jurisdiction shall hereafter be as provided by court rule, much as, in the 1933 Act,

360. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562,570,904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995); Territory v. Ortiz, I N.M.
(Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 5, 11-13 (1852); accordMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-76 (1803).
361. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641,647,249 P. 1074, 1076 (1926); Moriarty Mun. Sch. v. N.M. Pub. Sch.
Ins. Auth., 2001-NMCA-096, 29, 34 P.3d 124, 130.
26-30, 986 P.2d 450, 458-59; State
362. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, I'f
ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 6-7, 896 P.2d 1148, 1153-54 (1995).
363. Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995).
364. State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015,1 21,961 P.2d 768,774 ("[O]nlythe legislative branch
is constitutionally established to create substantive law."); Eturriaga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205, 209, 784 P.2d 24,
28 (1989) ("It is not the province of this Court to invalidate substantive policy choices made by the legislature.");
State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 314, 183 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1947).
365. See N.M. Right to ChooseNARAL, 1998-NMSC-028, 30, 986 P.2d at 458-59.
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it provided that pleading, practice, and procedure are to be regulated by court rule.3"
The constitutionality of such an act presumably would depend on whether the
legislature's power to provide by law for courts' jurisdiction can be delegated or
whether instead it is exclusively legislative. 367 However that may be, this Article
posits that an open-ended delegation of legislative power to prescribe the courts'
jurisdiction would be unwise. Article VI contemplates that the legislature will have
an ongoing role in regulating the courts' appellate jurisdiction, and there are good
reasons that it should. The authors' share Judge Encinias's view, enunciated in
response to a similar proposal in 1983, that the better course is to "honor the
constitutional mandates. 368
Short of the legislature relinquishing its power to provide for the courts'
jurisdiction, the task is to identify the concrete changes that are needed in order to
harmonize the pertinent rules and statutes. In fact, the necessary changes are quite
modest. The supreme court's evolution toward a true court of last resort has tended
to restore to the court of appeals the general error-correcting role assigned to it by
the basic jurisdictional statute, section 34-5-8. This trend is most evident in the
return of contract case appeals to the court of appeals, 369
but the evolution in the two
courts' respective roles extends beyond contract cases.
A simple change of wording should suffice to correct the discrepancy in Rule 12102(A)(4). To conform the rule to article VI, the 1986 amendment replacing
"specific provision of state law" with "supreme court order or rule" should be
undone.370 This change would appropriately acknowledge the legislature's
constitutional authority to provide for the courts' jurisdiction, and it would eliminate
the implication that the supreme court does not exercise jurisdiction as provided by
law. Perhaps Rule 12-102(A)(4) is merely emblematic of an underlying problem, but
solving the problem begins in this instance with a change of emblem.
The remaining discrepancies noted in this Article should be addressed through
the cooperative efforts of the supreme court and the legislature. In each case, the
discrepancy between rule and statute could be eliminated in either of two ways: (1)
the supreme court could withdraw a rule insofar as it purports to extend or withdraw
appellate jurisdiction, or (2) the legislature could codify and effectively ratify the
policy embodied in the rule.
For postconviction remedy proceedings, the basic question is whether appeals
should be heard in the first instance by the court of appeals in accordance with
section 34-5-8(A)(4) or by the supreme court in accordance with Rule 5-802.
Recognition of the court of appeals' statutory jurisdiction over appeals in such
proceedings (except those involving a sentence of death or life imprisonment) is
most consistent with the trend toward general error-correcting jurisdiction in the
court of appeals and discretionary review in the supreme court. The supreme court
366.
367.
368.
369.

NMSA 1978, § 38-1-1 (1966); see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
See State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 417-18, 60 P.2d 646, 659 (1936).
Encinias I, supra note 195, at 2.
A recent manifestation of this trend is the 2005 legislature's amendment of the Human Rights Act to

reassign jurisdiction over appeals under the Act from the supreme court to the court of appeals. Compare NMSA
1978, § 28-1-13(C) (1987) (allowing for "further appeal to the supreme court"), with id. § 28-1-13(C) (2005)
(allowing for "further appeal to the court of appeals").
370. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text; cf N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 29.
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retains original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 to issue writs of habeas
corpus, and that power would not change; but if it adhered to its past decisions, the
court would exercise its original power in the first instance only upon a showing of
controlling necessity.37 ' The lessons learned from two decades of experience under
Rule 5-802 are nonetheless relevant. In particular, the 2002 amendment of Rule 5802, establishing separate procedures for death penalty cases, goes part way toward
a logical division of appeals in postconviction proceedings.372 This portion of the
rule, if extended to encompass cases involving sentences of life imprisonment as
well as death, would dovetail with the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction over
such cases as established by the constitution and existing statutes 373 A further
amendment of Rule 5-802 might acknowledge the court of appeals' jurisdiction over
appeals in postconviction remedy proceedings not within the supreme court's
appellate jurisdiction.
Rule 21-900(C) presents a similar set of choices. There are practical reasons for
preferring the supreme court as the appellate forum in actions challenging conduct
in judicial election campaigns. The supreme court has superintending control over
the judiciary generally and authority to enforce disciplinary standards in
particular.7 4 The supreme court is the court to which the legislature has directed
appeals in other electoral disputes.3 75 The abbreviated time in which such disputes
occur also favors a right of direct appeal to the supreme court. All of these
circumstances are relevant to the legislature's consideration, but the fundamental
question of whether to create a right of action and an incident right of appeal is for
the legislature to decide. The legislature, in consultation with the supreme court,
should determine whether to enact a statute incorporating the provisions (or at least
the substantive provisions) of Rule 21-900(C).3 76 If the legislature ultimately rejects

the proposition that judicial candidates should have a right of action to contest
election conduct, the supreme court should withdraw Rule 21-900(C).
Finally, we believe that the writ of error is not well-suited as a procedural
mechanism for invoking the collateral order doctrine in the court of appeals. It
would be a simple matter, however, for the legislature to enact a statute authorizing
review in accordance with the collateral order doctrine. An existing statute, section
39-3-4, already authorizes interlocutory appeals under stated conditions.377 The
legislature could extend the authority for interlocutory appeal to the conditions
specified by the collateral order doctrine as adopted by the New Mexico Supreme
3 78

Court.

371. See, e.g., Exparte Nabors, 33 N.M. 324, 326, 267 P. 58, 59 (1928).
372. See Rule 5-802(F) NMRA.
373. N.M CONST. art. VI, §2; NMSA 1978, 88 34-5-8(A)(3)-(4) (1983), 34-5-14(A)(1972).
374. N.M. CONsT. art. VI, § 3; see Carrillo v. Compusys, Inc., 1997-NMCA-003, 10,930 P.2d 1172, 1174.
375. NMSA 1978, §§ 1-8-18 (1981), 1-8-35 (1993), 1-14-5 (1969), 1-17-13 (1969).
376. If the legislature chose to codify Rule 21-900(C) in its entirety, provisions deemed procedural would
presumably be subject to modification by supreme court rule in accordance with NMSA 1978, § 38-1-2 (1933) and
Rule 1-091 NMRA. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, Ill N.M. 336, 340-41, 805 P.2d 603, 607-08 (1991).
377. NMSA 1978, § 39-3-4 (1971) (authorizing interlocutory appeal where district court certifies that order
or decision involves controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that immediate appeal may materially advance ultimate termination of litigation).
378. See Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 613-15, 845 P.2d 130, 136-38 (1992).
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This Article has suggested that coordinated efforts of the supreme court and the
legislature hold out the best prospect for a successful resolution of the incongruities
that have been noted. But while collaboration is preferable, it should proceed from
a shared understanding of the legislature's constitutional prerogative to provide for
the courts' appellate jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that the courts have the last word
on whether the legislature has acted within its constitutional authority. It should also
be remembered that the legislature has the first word on the extent of the appellate
power.

